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Introduction
The British Columbia Coast Steamship Service

The story of the Pacific Northwest begins with the water. The water divided land from
land, but also connected land to land. People came to the land, and they used the water to
connect with each other. They formed shared experiences of the water and integrated their
collective knowledge of its patterns to create new ways to live alongside it. Eventually, people
designed steamships—wonderous machines powered by the vapor of water. People joined
together to form companies that would build and operate these machines. One of these
companies was called the British Columbia Coast Steamship Service.
Many people shared in the experience of this company’s steamships. Passengers used
them to reach their destinations. Businesspeople rented space aboard them to move their goods,
even if they did not travel on the water themselves. The goods they moved ended up being
bought by consumers, many of whom had never even seen a steamship, much less heard of the
Coast Steamship Service, but they, too, were impacted by the industry. Most of all, the people
who worked on and around the ships experienced them, but theirs is the story told least.
Growing up beside the waters of the Puget Sound, Strait of Georgia, and the broader
Salish Sea, it is hard for me not to see all of the connections back to our waterways. I took my
first ferry ride before I was old enough to even hold up my own head and I learned many of my
first words while being walked along the Sound’s fjords. As I got older, I came to love all things
involving transportation and the connections that travel inspires; travelling in Western
Washington, I took it for granted that boats connect places and therefore people. Toying as a
child with the jobs I might want “when I grow up,” I started to consume stories about travel both
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present and past, and so learned about the work that went into the business of transportation. A
decade or so later, between my periods of formal historical study, I became a member of the
Coast Guard Auxiliary to indulge my urge to deepen my knowledge of and experience with the
water. My time with that organization rewarded me with some portion of cultural immersion in
the marine industry. This experience, coupled with working for several summers on Orcas
Island, gaining lifeguard certifications, and teaching hundreds of elementary schoolers the basics
of saltwater paddling, brought me even greater appreciation for the ways in which water impacts
people.
Some evening or other, probably after a day trip facilitated by a Washington State Ferry,
my thoughts wandered northward and I wondered what the precursor to BC Ferries had been.
This question sparked my research into the British Columbia Coast Steamship Service (BCCS). I
soon discovered that BCCS had most everything a historian could want. It possessed a history of
around 100 years, which is more than enough to study but not so much that it could not be
studied deeply. It had fascinating characters about whom to learn. There were triumphs and
tragedies to be retold. From a logistical standpoint, it was a well-established company that left
copious archival records. I delved deeper into its history until I found, as historians do,
unanswered questions and so began my own research.
While considering my notes from that research one evening at my father’s house, Dad
brought my attention to an old 16mm home movie that had been made by my late grandfather. It
showed my grandparents, aunt, uncle, and toddler father boarding a ferry in Seattle that was
flying the old Canadian Red Ensign and a funny checkered flag. I skipped back in the video to
try and spy its name.1 It was Princess Joan, built in 1930, whose construction was envisioned by

1

Earle Christenson, Trips 1953-1956,1953, film, personal collection of John Christenson.
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BCCS Manager James Troup and set in motion by his successor Cyril Neroutsos (both figures
with whom readers will become quite familiar).2 After my elation at seeing the subject of my
research and subsequent disappointment that it was out of the temporal span of this particular
project, I reflected on the connectedness a short clip like this represents. There are very few
people in the Pacific Northwest whose lives have not been impacted somehow by the legacy of
the BC Coast Service, even if their family did not travel on a ship flying the red-and-white
checkered BCCS flag. The water and the technologies we have contrived to travel upon it
connect us to our history and to the stories of those who came before, stretching back to time
immemorial.
The first peoples of the Pacific Northwest have been here since before reckoning. In that
time, they developed means for travelling upon the water that connects the mainland and islands
of this place. Using these inventions, at least twenty established trading routes were in use by
1750, facilitating the movement of people, goods, and information between nations.3 Other
nations soon became aware of the region and its resources, and in 1849 the United Kingdom
created the Colony of Vancouver Island to impose its claim for territory in the Pacific
Northwest.4 On the other side of the Strait of Georgia, the Colony of British Columbia was not
incorporated until 1858 during the Fraser River Gold Rush.5 About six years later in 1866, the
two colonies united into a single British Columbia.6 Five years later still in 1871, BC joined the
fledgling Dominion of Canada after securing a promise for a transcontinental railway to connect

2

Norman R. Hacking and W. Kaye Lamb, The Princess Story: A Century and a Half of West Coast Shipping
(Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1974), 275.
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Jean Barman, The West Beyond the West: A History of British Columbia 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2007), 17.
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Barman, The West Beyond the West, 56.
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Barman, The West Beyond the West, 72.
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Barman, The West Beyond the West, 85 and 102-103.
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them with the east.7 While the people on the mainland could be assured that they would have
access to the prairies, Great Lakes, and Atlantic, British Columbians on both sides of the water
were waiting for reliable connections between the two former colonies.
The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) introduced the first steam-powered vessels to the
Salish Sea. In 1836, the original Beaver arrived and promptly began freight and passenger
service.8 In addition to their trading duties, Beaver’s crew were also used to enforce Canadian,
and Company, interests in the mid-1800s.9 The expanding colonies soon warranted imperial
protection and beginning in 1854 a Royal Navy presence at Esquimalt near Victoria bolstered the
maritime traffic and maritime enterprises in the area.10 Even despite this increase, parties,
including the Whatcom County Sheriff during the San Juan Boundary Dispute, sometimes still
found themselves using rowboats and canoes to travel Pacific Northwest waters.11 Clearly,
improved services were needed.
In December of 1877 the need for an enhanced shipping fleet was underscored when
Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) announced the selection of Burrard Inlet near the future
metropolis of Vancouver as their western terminus.12 The decision shocked and angered many on
Vancouver Island who had expected the terminus to be at Esquimalt, but equally meant that
strong ferry ties between the Island and mainland would be even more critical.13 In 1883, HBC
finally accepted that they could not manage the cross-strait traffic alone. They merged their
shipping venture with Fraser River steamship pioneer John Irving’s company to create the
Canadian Pacific Navigation Company (CPN, and originally of no corporate relation to CPR).
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8

5
CPN quickly grew to prominence in the “coastwise” (i.e. coastal) trade along the Strait of
Georgia, and by 1901, the company owned fourteen vessels.14
On January 10, 1901, Canadian Pacific Railway surprised British Columbians by
becoming the majority owner of the Canadian Pacific Navigation Company and on March 5th
they installed their new chief of operations: James William Troup.15 A towering figure in the
history of BCCS, Troup had navigated the rivers and fjords of Oregon, Washington, and British
Columbia for many years and had long since earned the title of “Captain,” by which he was
commonly known.16 Captain Troup, now tasked with managing a fleet of saltwater vessels,
initially made very few changes, notably continuing to operate the service under the name
“Canadian Pacific Navigation Company” despite it now being owned by CPR.17 Eventually, the
“CPN” name would be phased out in favor of “British Columbia Coast Service.”18 BCCS, often
just called the Coast Service, operated as a semi-autonomous division of CPR. Troup was
officially responsible to one CPR Vice President or another over the years, but in practice was
given a relatively free hand to run the Coast Service how he believed most prudent.19
One way in which Troup used this authority was to push through the purchase or
construction of a slate of new vessels. While the ships bought from CPN retained their old, nonroyal names, all newly acquired vessels (with three exceptions during Troup’s time as Manager)
would bear the title “Princess.”20 The naming scheme took hold in popular parlance and thus

14

Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 188.
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 187-188.
16
Robert D. Turner, The Pacific Princesses: An Illustrated History of Canadian Pacific Railway’s Princess Fleet on
the Northwest Coast (Victoria: Sono Nis, 1977), 41.
17
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 188.
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Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 188-189.
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Turner, The Pacific Princesses, 41.
20
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 191 and 341-345. The exceptions were Joan (not to be confused with the
later Princess Joan built in 1930), City of Nanaimo, and Nootka.
15
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BCCS added yet another byname: the “Princess Fleet.”21 The first new Princess was Princess
May, formerly the Hating, bought shortly after Troup became Manager in 1901.22 Less than a
year later, Princess Victoria and Princess Beatrice were on order from a shipyard in England.23
Over the next twenty-six years until Troup retired, twenty more vessels came into service on the
coastwise trade.24
The trade was certainly busy enough to support such a fleet. While the VictoriaVancouver run had been a staple since CPN days, the addition of Victoria-Seattle as a major
route after the loss of competitor Puget Sound Navigation Company’s (PSNC) Clallam
inaugurated a new era for the Coast Service.25 Initially called the “crazy run” due to pushing
Princess Victoria hard to complete a double service between Seattle-Victoria-Vancouver daily,
the addition of a direct Vancouver-Seattle leg in 1908 completed the “triangle service” which
headlined BCCS schedules for decades to come.26 A rate war between PSNC and BCCS
promptly ensued, seeing fares cut by both parties as low as $0.25, but ultimately resolving in
PSNC’s semi-capitulation and acceptance of a working truce with their Canadian rival.27
While service between Victoria, Vancouver, and Seattle took much of the attention of
BCCS executives, they did not lose sight of other routes. The Gulf Islands, located between
Vancouver Island and the mainland, sat in the eye of the “triangle” and were not served by the
mainline boats. Instead, a smattering of vessels from the purpose-built Island Princess to the old
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Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 191; and Turner, The Pacific Princesses, 41.
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 192. Princess May was named for the soon-to-be Queen Mary, then still
Duchess of Cornwall and York, in anticipation of her visit to BC.
23
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 193.
24
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 269 and 341-343. Although only twenty entered BCCS service, twentytwo were purchased. Princess Margaret and Princess Irene were commandeered by the Royal Navy, had an “HMS”
added before their “Princess,” and were pressed into service as minelayers in World War I (Ibid., 343).
25
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 211.
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Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 212-213.
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Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 212-216.
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but comfortable Charmer called at ports among the islands.28 The rugged west coast of
Vancouver Island was served by two vessels in succession, both dedicated exclusively to its
service: Tees and then Princess Maquinna.29 Navigating the Strait of Georgia on the other side of
the island, leisure travel to Alaska saw a particular boom during World War I as Canadian and
American vacationers turned their attentions northward instead of eastward to European
destinations.30
By the end of Troup’s tenure as Manager, BCCS embraced tourist traffic as a key part of
their operations. The company heavily promoted special outings and sightseeing cruises, drawing
upon its reputation for outstanding service to bring in new customers.31 The advertising seems to
have worked. “From the original purchase price of $531,000” in 1901, wrote the late W. Kaye
Lamb, BCCS’ value had increased to $8,606,000 by 1929 and netted $1,333,000 profit at its high
in 1927.32 Retiring “at the peak of his fleet’s prosperity,” James Troup left the company in 1928,
consigning to history an era of profound growth for BCCS.33 Troup’s nearly three decades
leading the Coast Service constitute a convenient framework within which to examine the early
period of the company, and it is within these temporal bounds that this project is set.
Two academic histories of BCCS have been published in book form. Norman Hacking
and W. Kaye Lamb had the honor of authoring the first of them: The Princess Story. Hacking
and Lamb’s work is split evenly between what they call the service’s “ancestry” and then the BC
Coast Service itself.34 Viewing BCCS as the successor to previous fleets is not only historically

28

Turner, The Pacific Princesses, 139.
Gordon Newell, ed., The H. W. McCurdy Marine History of the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: Superior Publishing,
1966), 219.
30
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 244.
31
Turner, The Pacific Princesses, 135-136.
32
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 273.
33
Turner, The Pacific Princesses, 139.
34
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, unnumbered [immediately prior to page 1] and 181.
29
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accurate from an economic perspective, but it also correctly recognizes the longstanding central
position of maritime transportation and trade in the Pacific Northwest. Recalling Hudson’s Bay
Company vessels and tracing their legacy directly down to CPR’s Princesses provides a
thorough understanding of the changing needs served by shipping companies and how the
creation of BCCS was a response to those historical pressures. Hacking and Lamb expertly
evaluate the Princess Fleet’s operation as a company and how it met the needs of customers.
The other of the more scholarly treatments of the BC Coast Steamship Service is Robert
Turner’s The Pacific Princesses. While this is an “illustrated history” and clearly meant for a
slightly broader audience than Hacking and Lamb’s book, it nonetheless offers a thorough
overview of the fleet. Beginning in the 1840s and offering only a passing reference to indigenous
modes of transportation, Turner covers in only thirty pages the corporate ancestry that Hacking
and Lamb retell in one hundred seventy-nine.35 What Turner’s Princesses may lack in prose it
more than makes up for in presenting history visually. The book is filled with an outstanding
collection of photographs, pamphlets, and charts that provide context otherwise difficult to relate
through the written word alone.
Two other books bear mention in relation to histories of the BC Coast Service. The first
is Those Beautiful Coastal Liners, a second work by Robert Turner. 36 While Pacific Princesses
may be “illustrated,” Those Beautiful Coastal Liners approaches the level of a coffee-table book.
Published in 2001, it draws heavily on Princesses for its content but makes the history of the
fleet more accessible to a general audience with its even shorter page count, approachable
vocabulary, and color photos. On the other extreme, The H. W. McCurdy Marine History of the
Pacific Northwest, produced by a committee of authors and edited by Gordon Newell, is a

35
36

Turner, The Pacific Princesses, 1.
Robert D. Turner, Those Beautiful Coastal Liners: The Canadian Pacific’s Princesses (Victoria: Sono Nis, 2001).
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chronological and encyclopedic record of major maritime events from 1895 to 1966, but does not
attempt scholarly interpretation of those events.37
An observation of the paperback edition of The Princess Story exemplifies one of the
main problems with the existing historiography: its lack of attention to the people. The book’s
back cover gives its top half to an uncaptioned photo of a group of men posing for the picture,
about a third of whom are in vaguely “uniform” attire; below the picture is the headline “a saga
of memorable ships.”38 The anonymous crew are ignored completely in favor of the ships they
worked on. The titles of books on the subject, too, show the preoccupation with the vessels
themselves, none more so than Those Beautiful Coastal Liners.
The unpublished notes of these historians further show their lack of focus on labor. The
W. Kaye Lamb Collection at Vancouver Maritime Museum is blessed to have Lamb’s notes
from compiling his work on the Princess Fleet, including those related to his coauthored Princess
Story. The collection is replete with lists of ships, their technical details, the dates of when
service started or stopped at certain ports, and even a beautiful hand-drawn map of CPR disasters
in Alaska’s Lynn Canal, but the closest it comes to dealing with people are his several
biographical sketches of Troup and a list of ships’ officers in 1901.39 Previous historians’ focus
on James Troup is understandable—he was a tremendously important figure in the company’s
history—but he was only one of many and was even noted by his contemporaries as especially
open to input from his subordinates.40 Even when considering Troup alone as representative of

37

Newell, Marine History of the Pacific Northwest.
Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, back cover. Indeed, the crews’ uniforms would be indistinguishable from
any other company’s if not for their unique cap badges identifiable only to those already somewhat versed in the
company’s history.
39
W. Kaye Lamb Collection, Vancouver Maritime Museum, Vancouver. The list of officers is in folder 15, box 1.
Lynn Canal map is in folder 1, box 2.
40
J. A. Heritage, interview with W. Kaye Lamb, notes, W. Kaye Lamb Collection, Vancouver Maritime Museum,
Vancouver. Troup is discussed further in Chapter One.
38
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the human element in previous works, authors have given the man—as opposed to the
Manager—short shrift. In Hacking and Lamb’s book, Troup-the-Man is introduced in single
(albeit substantial) paragraph early on but is almost immediately subsumed by Troup-theManager.41 Considering only him is to exclude all the other employees of the company and do a
disservice to understanding the human element of the company’s story and the labor required to
keep the company afloat.
Historians of maritime labor have generally sought to synthesize the experiences of
classes of sailor across many different employers. Attempting an expansive argument that the
shipping industry had been a global one since the nineteenth century, Sweatshops at Sea by Leon
Fink focuses on the developments in sailors’ labor that had international reach.42 Particularly
useful are his examinations of early twentieth century seamen’s unionism and how race impacted
labor. In making a globalized and long-spanning argument, however, Fink’s work does not
account for local differences nor does he engage deeply with how the transition from sails to
engines affected the seaman’s craft. Eric Sager’s Ships and Memories, on the other hand,
confines its focus geographically to Canada and temporally to the “Age of Steam,” and is an
excellent survey of work aboard steamships.43 Its poignant depictions of the realities of nautical
work display an appreciation for the people who operated these boats, but perhaps loses, at times,
the thread that sailors were also employees of companies, large and small.
The vessels of this company, the BC Coast Service, were run by people. At no point did a
BCCS Princess spontaneously operate, even when personified as a “she”—a convention

41

Hacking and Lamb, The Princess Story, 185-186.
Leon Fink, Sweatshops at Sea: Merchant Seamen in the World’s First Globalized Industry, from 1812 to the
Present (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), Kindle.
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Eric W. Sager, Ships and Memories: Merchant Seafarers in Canada’s Age of Steam (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1993).
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frequently observed in the historiography. While the historiography of BCCS has admirably
tracked the formation and acquisition of companies, celebrated the purchases and sales of ships,
and charted the shifting routes served, it has largely ignored the people staffing the boats. But it
was managers who made decisions about when and how to deploy capital. Crewmembers
maintained and ran the vessels. Officers shouldered responsibility for hundreds of lives as they
ferried passengers and cargo from port to port. To focus exclusively on how much horsepower
“she” generated, or the profits earned for “her” corporation’s shareholders, is to lose sight of the
foundation of history. This thesis aims to anchor the story of BCCS firmly to the people whose
labor made the company’s services possible.
Just as the story of the Pacific Northwest begins with the water, the story of the BC Coast
Service starts with the people who plied that water. Chapter One discusses the individuals who
were directly involved in operating the boats. Captains, Officers, Engineers, and Seamen were all
partly responsible for safely navigating44 the Salish Sea, and each group held its own distinct
status aboard. Ashore, the Manager and his Victoria headquarters staff oversaw the fleet of
coastwise vessels, made recommendations up to higher headquarters in Winnipeg, and passed
directives down to the crews.
While the service that customers were buying was the transportation facilitated by the
employees in operational roles, actually serving those guests required an entirely different class
of crew. Chapter Two focuses on the staff who created customers’ experiences with BCCS.
Along with their colleagues sequestered away in the ship’s galley, uniformed Stewards and
Pursers assisted passengers while freight crews handled goods and mail. Agents crewed the

It should be noted that in nautical parlance, “to navigate” means not only “to determine one’s location and chart a
course,” but also “to operate or conduct one’s vessel.” In that sense, it could be considered synonymous with “to
sail” but “navigate” is the preferred verb because “to sail” implies the vessel is propelled by the wind. BCCS vessels
were universally steamers, not sailboats.
44
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company’s physical presences on land, sometimes forming a vital link in the communications
chain between Victoria and vessels further afield.
Both sides of the company—Operations and Customer Service—needed to work together
in order to generate wages for themselves and profits for shareholders. In growing and
industrializing British Columbia during the height of labor movement, working together was not
always without its challenges. Chapter Three examines labor relations within BCCS, particularly
as they came to a head during strikes in 1918 and 1919. It will be seen that workers’ demands
and the company’s responses fit generally into a pattern of relearning how to work together
during a period of strain and change. Additionally, the strikes reveal some of the intersections
between the crew’s social and economic identities in broader British Columbian society.
Ultimately, working for the British Columbia Coast Service was a good proposition for
many. It was stable, maritime employment that cultivated community among the crew. BCCS
was relatively responsive to worker demands and management kept abreast of pay discrepancies.
It was, however, still demanding work. Rules and regulations had to be learned and obeyed.
Machinery needed to be oiled and boilers fed fuel. Revenues had to be accounted for and guests
shown to their cabins. Literal tons of freight were loaded and unloaded. Meals were prepared by
the score. The ships, assaulted by salt spray and the daily activities of hundreds aboard, had to be
meticulously cleaned. Most importantly, all of these tasks had to be done while maintaining an
environment in which customers could simply enjoy the glamour of travel without thinking
about the hours of labor that went into their experience. That was the task of the employees of
the BC Coast Steamship Service. The story of their work deserves to be retold.
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Chapter One
Running The Boats
“The duty of all…will be the comfort of the public”
– Regulations for the Navigation of the British Columbia Coast Service Steamships of the
Canadian Pacific Railway Company

Ships are meant to travel across waters, not merely sit upon them. A ship does not move
on its own, however. The Seamen, Engineers, and Officers who worked for the British Columbia
Coast Steamship Service (BCCS) were responsible for navigating their vessels throughout the
waters of the Pacific Northwest and providing its people with reliable connections between the
region’s many ports. While the specific communities they served and the boats on which they
served them were decided mostly by BCCS Manager James W. Troup, the Captains and their
crews were the ones who made the system work.
While generally found ashore, Troup was nonetheless a noticeable presence in all aspects
of operating the Coast Service. Afloat, the top of the social hierarchy was the Captain, who was
given ultimate responsibility for the crew’s work and the vessel itself. Below him and bound to
similar operational and social responsibilities were the Officers. The line of command flowed
from the bridge to the engine room, where the Engineers, Firemen, Oilers, and Coal Passers
toiled in their hot and dirty compartments away from the public’s eye. Although visible, the
work of the Seamen, Quartermasters, Lookouts, and Watchmen was supposed to fade away into
the background of life aboard. Each of these groups were part of the broader crew that served
Canadian and American customers, but they are distinguished by serving BCCS’ guests
indirectly. Nonetheless, these workers were the ones who generated the service purchased by the
company’s patrons. The tasks assigned to each group within the operational divisions of the crew
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reveal how different kinds of work were valued and the kinds of people expected to accomplish
the work.

Managing the Fleet
Captain James W. Troup managed the British Columbia Coast Steamship Service for
nearly thirty years from 1901 to 1928. He presided over a period of expansion and
transformation in the company, including its deployment of the new boats christened with the
name “Princess” and the inauguration of the hallmark “triangle service” between Victoria,
Vancouver, and Seattle. Troup was not one to leave details to his subordinates, and the Manager
had an active influence in everything from scheduling to the percentage of cargo space reserved
for canned fish.1 Of the many roles he played within BCCS, two bear the most significance:
using his decades of experience to decide the routes that were to be supported by his company
and designing the vessels that would run them.
Troup began his nautical career captaining riverine steamships along the waterways of
the Pacific Northwest. In truth, Troup had a bit of a wild his youth. Gaining a reputation as
daring to the point of foolhardy, in 1878 he took Harvest Queen, a paddle-wheeler, over the
Columbia River’s Celilo Falls, breaking both of the ship’s rudders, part of its sternwheel, and
snapping its anchor chain.2 After stopping briefly for some emergency repairs, Troup then
proceeded down river and shot both Ten-Mile and Five-Mile Rapids “with only minor damage.”3
In 1881, Troup captained Harvest Queen down Tumwater Rapids, and in 1890 went through

J. W. Troup, “Memo of items that will be brought up by me at Meeting,” October 21, 1916, folder 2, box 8, Earl
Marsh Collection (PR-2362), British Columbia Archives, Victoria (hereafter cited “EMC”).
2
Gordon Newell, ed., The H. W. McCurdy Marine History of the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: Superior Publishing,
1966), 8.
3
Newell, ed., Marine History of the Pacific Northwest, 8.
1
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Cascade Rapids.4 Eventually growing out of at least some of his hubristic tendencies and having
put on years with John Irving’s mixed fresh- and salt-water Pioneer Line in lower British
Columbia, Captain Troup became the chief of the Columbia & Kootenay, later Canadian Pacific
Railway (CPR), Lake and River Service.5 It was from this posting that Troup was promoted upon
CPR’s takeover of the Canadian Pacific Navigation Company.
At the beginning of Troup’s tenure, British Columbia was a bifurcated, though officially
united, province. Victoria, the province’s capital, was located on Vancouver Island. Vancouver,
across the Strait of Georgia, was quickly taking over for New Westminster as the urban center on
the mainland, due in no small part to BCCS parent company Canadian Pacific Railway’s
decision to make Burrard Inlet (on which Vancouver lies) its western terminus. Connecting the
two population centers fell to the steamship crews. There was never really any question that
Vancouver and Victoria would have connections by water; even in the midst of strikes when all
other routes were cancelled, Troup himself would take the boat out on the Vancouver-Victoria
run if necessary.6 The outlying runs, however, were more in question. At meetings with his
senior subordinates, Troup did not shy away from difficult questions: “are we… continuing
permanently in that [the Gulf Islands] business, or are we to drop out in favor of some other
Company? . . . Are we to operate the ‘Princess Charlotte’ in [the Alaska] trade next summer? If
so, how many trips?”7 Clearly, Troup was comfortable with the answer being “no.” Regarding a
remote and unprofitable Alaskan community, the captain recommended pulling the plug: “In
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view of the small amount of patronage given us by the Granby bay people, would suggest that it
is time for us to consider withdrawing form that port.”8
One service from which Troup would find it difficult to withdraw was the famous
“triangle” between Victoria, Vancouver, and Seattle. Partly, this was due to sentimental reasons.
The triangle had been largely the captain’s baby, requiring years of planning and building to
grow. As a business friend wrote him late in their careers: “The old triangle is probably dearer to
you and me than anybody else, as we have sat up with it and nursed it longer.”9 Parental feelings
towards the service aside, there were sound business reasons for maintaining all three legs.
BCCS was, after all, a division of a railway company and “the triangular route between
Vancouver, Victoria and Seattle performs services that are of very great importance to our rail
interests,” its own profitability somewhat notwithstanding.10
The main drain on profitability was capital investments. Ships are expensive, especially
when built to James Troup’s standard. When he first took over in 1901, BCCS was comprised
mostly of vessels acquired from the Canadian Pacific Navigation Company.11 After those had
been replaced, then the company focused on having relief vessels. After the Tees was
unexpectedly taken out of service, Troup remarked that “practically three services were disturbed
on account of this accident.”12 He continued, arguing: “The necessity for adequate spare boats to
any company increases with the number of boats required in performing its services, and we
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should not expect a never ending run of good luck.”13 Upper management, apparently, agreed
and authorized the additional vessels. The final shipbuilding challenge of his career came with
serving the growing motorist population of the Pacific Northwest. Old boats retrofitted with car
decks generated “many complaints made by motorists on account of the difficulty and time
occupied in stowing their cars on board, having to turn and twist in awkward places in order to
get them on,” when they fit at all.14 “It is impossible to carry a closed car on the Nanaimo route,”
an employee reported, due to the height of the deck. Ultimately, this, too, was recommended by
Troup to “be provided without any further delay.”15 In order to ensure that new ships would
serve the purposes with which Troup was so carefully familiar, he personally approved many of
the details of each vessel. This included trips to the United Kingdom to supervise the final stages
of construction for several of the boats purchased by the company under his administration.16
Managerial authority came with perks besides company trips across the pond. Most
tangible of these benefits was pay. Troup made $500.00 per month in 1909, increasing to
$700.00 in 1917, and only a year later it inflated again to $833.33.17 Beyond wealth and its
obvious comforts, the real privilege of Troup’s position was rubbing elbows with other powerful
men. Arguably, the most spectacular of Troup’s acquaintances was the later King Edward VIII
during his first tour of Canada while still Prince of Wales, though Troup missed His Royal
Highness’ second trip to British Columbia.18 A much more frequent, if less royal, contact was
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Joshua Green, the contemporaneous head of the Puget Sound Navigation Company (PSNC), also
called the Black Ball Line. As Troup’s longtime friend and sometime rival, Green maintained a
cheery correspondence with the captain. For instance, in lieu of postcards, the two habitually
exchanged transportation passes valid on each other’s networks.19 They leveraged their
respective personal networks as well. For instance, Green, involved in trying to force through a
railway easement for a timber venture on Vancouver Island, once asked Troup to set up a
meeting with the Premier, the Attorney General, and two other provincial ministers since “you
[Troup] are so familiar with British Columbia matters.”20 In return, the BCCS office in Seattle
received special treatment from Green’s post-PSNC venture, People’s Bank. “I will see to it,”
Green wrote to Troup, “that the bank and its officials extend value received in every way for this
account.”21 It was, perhaps, in part due to the value received by both parties that Green would
write in 1927: “My close friendship with the officials of the Canadian Pacific Railway has
helped make life pleasant and happy for me. I admire not only their business ability but their
wholesome balance in their social and family life.”22
Though his friends may compliment his business ability and work-life balance, the stress
of managing the Coast Service still had its effects. It did not escape Troup that he was the
custodian of a vital link between the main population centers of growing British Columbia. He
reflected that BCCS was “practically the only means of communication, particularly between the
Mainland and Vancouver Island,” and resisted a potential rate increase accepting that “we have a
responsibility and a duty to perform, and during dull periods we must bear our burden with the
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public generally.”23 Troup took this responsibility and burden seriously and seems to have
worked himself hard when times required it. Working through “an attack of Influenza, or
something very similar” that he had “never been able to shake” after two months in late 1918 and
developing “an asmathic [sic] condition, which has become chronic,” Troup pushed his health to
the limit in order to deal with the aftermath of Princess Sophia’s sinking in 1918.24 Other
projects, such as the deployment of the new ships Princess Kathleen and Princess Marguerite,
even though planned well ahead, were large enough in scope to take a toll. Troup, who insisted
on being involved in much of the minutia of the company’s workings, found that “there has been
so much detail and anxiety connected with the installation of this service that I find it is
beginning to tell on my nerves, and I will be obliged to take a lay off of a week or so in the near
future.”25 Just three years later, the old captain decided nearly three decades as manager of the
British Columbia Coast Steamship Service were quite enough. James Troup retired on
September 1, 1928.26

Captains
Captains—officially known as “Masters” and less formally as “skippers”—were
responsible for the ship and everything that happened aboard. Charged with “devot[ing] their
whole time and attention to the management and care of their ship and cargo, and to the safety
and comfort of the passengers,” to be a BCCS Captain was no easy calling.27 The very first
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regulation in the Coast Service’s manual underscores the captain’s culpability, even in the event
that some other member of the crew had made the mistake: “The Master will be held responsible
for the observance of these instructions,” not necessarily the crewmember who made the
mistake.28 In practice, as will be seen, the Captain could sometimes be absolved of culpability
under the right circumstances, but the threat of joint responsibility inclined them towards
thoroughness in their instructions to the crew. To that end, the Master “will see that thorough
discipline is maintained,” the regulation continued, “and they are held responsible for any
pilferage on the ship, and for any damage to the Company’s property through their own
carelessness or that of their crew,” again underscoring their generalized responsibility afloat.29
The Captain’s command on their vessel while underway was nearly absolute, regulations
granting that “members of the crew are in every respect subject to the control and orders of the
Master.”30 This meant, in essence, that if the Master gave a crewmember a direction, they had to
obey it. If they failed to do so, they were subject to the Captain’s discipline, up to and including
termination. The only people over whom the master did not have total authority were the
department heads such as the Chief Engineer or the Purser.31 The skipper could only suspend
them if he had adequate cause while underway, and even then only “pending investigation from
the Head Office.”32 There was nothing on the ship that was not touched by the captain on a daily
basis except, perhaps, the engine room itself which was left in the trust of the chief engineer.33
He inspected passengers’ quarters, frequently ate in the ship’s dining saloon, and checked on the
welfare of customers and crew. Most commonly, however, he could be found on the bridge or
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his adjoining quarters, supervising the safe navigation of the vessel. The Master’s power while
the ship was in port, while lessened as there was less safety-critical work being done, was still
very much present. For instance, captains were responsible to “see that no idlers stay about the
ships,” nor that the families of crewmembers present distractions for them by “frequent[ing]”
their workplace.34 Besides maintaining command of an efficient ship personally, the skipper was
also a critical link in the chain of communication between the Head Office and their crews.
The most routine of the Captain’s communication tasks was the upkeep of the ship’s
several logbooks. Required to detail in various logs every movement of the ship, the crew on
watch, the weather, the water drawn by the vessel (i.e., how far below the water line the bottom
of the hull was) when entering and leaving Victoria and Vancouver, and several other minute
pieces of information, the Captain’s logs gave management a clear understanding of their
voyages.35 This insight into the voyage was particularly useful to management when captains
were still getting used to giving regular progress reports via ship-board wireless. Captain Gillam
of Princess Maquinna, which exclusively handled business on the west coast of Vancouver
Island, was chastised by management for his lack of updates. “The Wireless reports from the
‘Princess Maquinna’ on the last trip were not at all satisfactory,” wrote Troup, adding that he
“should like to have a report from you at least once per day.”36 Progress checks notwithstanding,
the log maintained by the captain provided a much fuller picture than brief messages via
wireless. Certainly, in the case of accidents, the records from the log (which had to include the
“full particulars” of the event) allowed the company to present a consistent version of events to
other parties.37 Similarly, the Captain’s logs allowed the company to hold its own employees
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accountable. Masters received the various company “Circulars” and were charged with
communicating their contents to the appropriate members of the crew and then noting that they
had done so in the log.38 Supervisors documenting that their subordinates have been instructed in
policy was far from unusual, but Captains were encouraged to do more than simply ensure good
order and discipline aboard their ships.
Masters occupied a nebulous grey area between employee and management. When
arguing against their unionization, management recognized Captains’ unique status among the
company’s employees. Troup wrote that “the men in command of our steamers, in order to be
successful, must necessarily be advised of the Company's business interests, and treated with
confidential matters, and should be on a different plane from other employees afloat.”39 The
business interests and confidential matters with which Captains might be entrusted could range
from upcoming service plans to shipping rates and pay scales. It was Captains’ access to these
financial details about which management was most concerned, as the information could be used
in collective bargaining negotiations.40 The Masters’ access to BCCS’ privileged business
information combined with their practical knowledge of running their vessels also meant that
they were excellently positioned to give advice on modifying they company’s operations. BCCS
codified acknowledgement of Captains’ circumstances in this respect, adding to the service’s
regulation book: “Masters are requested to report freely anything which in their opinion will
better the service or tend towards the economical working of the line, and their suggestions are
promised the most careful consideration.”41 While the company’s “most careful consideration”
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was offered for suggestions that would enhance profit, Masters’ attentions were called to ensure
that they logged the time and place in which they met or passed other BCCS vessels.42 While
logging meetings with other ships was not uncommon, the positive instruction that the
company’s own ships be noted leads one to suspect that Captains were being used to generate
reports on their fellow skippers. Logs could be compared against one another to ensure accuracy
and Captains knew that their fellow officers were watching for them on the water, notating their
timeliness. This was in keeping with BCCS regulations, which expected the master “to have
general supervision over all employees, and to report to the Head Office at Victoria anything that
to them may seem contrary to the interests of the Company or to the welfare and success of the
service” even in cases in which they had only limited direct authority, such as over the heads of
shipboard departments.43 Things that may be “contrary to the interests of the Company”
expressly included any employee using an “expression disparaging to the company,” which he
was required to report “at the first opportunity.”44
Beyond their responsibility to the ship and its crew, Captains had social responsibilities to
the passengers. Regulations stated that “it is the duty of the Master to see that passengers of all
grades receive uniform civility and attention from everyone in the service.”45 Part of this duty
was the daily inspection made at noon by the Captain and the Chief Steward of all cabins and
public areas of the ship to ensure they were “in a clean and neat condition” and otherwise in
proper order.46 Although the class of service rarely appeared in the company advertising
materials, called out for special attention by the master were the “second-class or steerage
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quarters” to ensure that those “passengers are properly cared for by the Company’s
employees.”47 Properly caring for passengers meant taking the customer’s view in all aspects of
operations. For instance, Captain Hickey of Princess Victoria was chided by Troup for allowing
“the washing of decks over people’s heads” and for the discourteous use of the ship’s whistle.48
Commanding a large, powerful steamer that had been in service only a year-and-a-half, Hickey
seems to have been overly active in alerting other vessels to his presence when entering the
capital city’s Inner Harbour. “You woke up all your passengers and half the people in Victoria…
at 4.30 this morning . . . [and] repeated the annoyance about 30 minutes later” Troup complained
in his letter to the Captain, before instructing him to exercise greater restraint with sound
signals.49 Noticeably, Troup’s instruction to Captain Hickey was not for purpose of safety or
enhancement of operations, but instead solely for the sake of polite conduct towards the sleepers
of Victoria. The skipper’s position as the most senior officer meant they had correspondingly
higher expectations placed upon them; captains were certainly not, however, the only members
of the crew of whom certain social norms were expected.

The Officers
All Officers were required to uphold a respectable appearance. As members of an
educated class whose years of expensive training in maritime academies to prepare them for
licensure exams, Officers represented the collected knowledge—learned both from books and
experience—of centuries at sea.50 Their education implied social standing and in some ways
mirrored that of gentrified class that comprised the upper echelons of military command;
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historian Eric Sager suggests that this is why the Masters and Mates became known as
“Officers,” arguing that steamships were “an industrial workplace that borrowed military
language and attitudes.”51 Another of the merchant marine’s military acquisitions was the
Officer’s uniform. BCCS Regulations required that uniforms be worn whenever aboard the ship
regardless of whether it was underway or not.52 Officers’ dark woolen suits sported gold sleeve
lacing indicating rank, the top two rows wove around each other to create a small square in
which was embroidered a maple leaf.53 Their peaked caps displayed devices depicting the
company’s red and white checkered flag crowned, literally, with a crown and encircled in laurel
made with gilt thread.54 These they wore day and night, in sun and rain, through fog and salt
spray. They kept them presentable in front of customers despite the hazards of the climate, errant
spoonfulls of soup from dinner, and their own perspiration.
At least, in theory, their uniforms were safe from wine stains and burn marks since all
officers were strictly barred from drinking or smoking at any point while they were on board.
They were forbidden from going to the Bar Room or keeping a private stock within their own
quarters. “Any report of officers drinking spiritous liquors,” the regulation read, would “be
deemed sufficient cause for dismissal” and those found to be actually under the influence would
“be instantly dismissed.”55 Gambling, too, was prohibited, as was even wager-free card
playing.56 Officers were expected to reject the stereotype of the foul-mouthed sailor, being
banned from profane language.57 The company’s demand that they present an entirely
wholesome, professional appearance is entirely understandable given officers’ visibility to the

51

Sager, Ships and Memories, 71.
Regulations, 4.
53
Canadian Pacific, “Uniform Regulations,” 1931, folder 1, box 8, EMC.
54
Cap device, folder 1, box 8, EMC.
55
Regulations, 5. Emphasis added.
56
Regulations, 5.
57
Regulations, 5.
52

26
public. It is also understandable that the weighty social expectations placed upon them coupled
with the burden of assisting in the command of the vessel led some to wonder why they should
want to take the job when they could potentially make more money “as a quartermaster without
responsibility, and without having to keep up any appearances.”58
The officers did indeed have many responsibilities beyond keeping up appearances. Chief
among them: “the safe navigation of the ship.”59 “They must run no risk,” the rule emphatically
continued, “which, by any possibility, might result in accident. They must always bear in mind
that the safety of life and property entrusted to their care is the ruling principle by which they
must be governed.”60 Supporting the officers’ grave responsibility aboard the vessel were a
number of other rules. They could not “under any circumstances” talk with passengers or leave
the bridge if they were on watch, they could not engage in racing, and they were “expressly
instructed to stop the engines instantly … without waiting for the Master’s instructions” in the
case of immediate danger.61 On the unpredictable Strait of Georgia, and particularly in its
northern reaches on the route to Alaskan ports, weather that impaired visibility was (and is) not
uncommon. To defray some of the risk, BCCS vessels were required to have “two Officers … on
the bridge and a double lookout kept” in addition to other precautions when faced with adverse
conditions such as “thick or foggy weather, and in snowstorms.”62 When the ships typically only
had three or four officers on their crews, the requirement for two of them to be in the wheelhouse
not infrequently could be a significant burden on already busy employees.63
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The degree to which the individual officers were busy varied, naturally, by their specific
position. The Chief Officer was one of the busiest since he effectively served as a deputy Captain
and handled the administrative tasks that would otherwise be assigned to the skipper, including
the updating two of the ship’s logs under the Captain’s direction.64 Chief Officers also
maintained the navigation equipment, most critically the charts and signaling devices such as day
shapes and colored lanterns.65 Keeping charts updated was not as simple as going ashore to
purchase a new one since both hazards and aids to navigation would sometimes unexpectedly
change location, requiring immediate update to the chart before a corrected version could be
published.
The First and Second Officers worked in tandem with only slight differences in their
roles. The First Officer took charge of safety equipment and was the ship’s taskmaster, being
given the instruction to “work the crew.”66 Working the crew included responsibility for the
“expeditious and economical handling” of cargo, one of the only times an officer would interface
directly with the company’s freight operations. After loading operations were complete and then
continually while underway, the First Officer would remain cognizant of the hatches and loading
doors, ensuring that they were open at all times practical to allow fresh air into the hold but not
when doing so “might endanger life or property.”67 Beyond just their work, the First Officer was
also in charge of the crew’s off time, including inspecting their quarters for cleanliness but also
checking that the food served to them was “properly cooked and served,” implying not only care
for palatability and not only its wholesomeness.68 These tasks were all completed with the
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assistance of the Second Officer, whose only individual responsibility besides assisting his
superiors was taking charge of the mail.69 Nonetheless, the mailroom was a heavy responsibility;
the contract for the Victoria-Seattle mail route alone was worth $15,000.00 per year as of 1929.70
This was on par with other mail routes BCCS held, such as the West Coast of Vancouver Island
and Victoria-Skagway, which justified giving it an officer’s precious individual attention.
Each of these officers also held a general responsibility for the safe navigation of the ship
as any might be the officer in charge at a given moment. Except on the smallest boats that only
had a Master and a Mate (synonymous here with “officer”) due to their size and relative lack of
complexity, BCCS vessels always counted a Master, a First Officer, and a Second officer on
their payroll.71 Frequently, but not always, there was a Chief Officer or sometimes a second
Second Officer, again depending on the ship’s size and complexity, with the larger and most
complex vessels warranting additional officers.72 Shipboard chains of command grew even more
lengthened as the service progressed, and by 1931 the rank of Third Officer—essentially an
officer at large who could step in wherever needed—was in use.73 This clarity was necessary as
aboard a ship the chain of command is vital; it was so vital that the chain of command from
Master to Chief Officer to First Officer and so on appears as the third regulation in book.74 The
captain could, and did, devolve authority onto his subordinates to command the ship in his
absence. This is devolution of command is exemplified by the regulation specifying that all
crewmembers are “subject to the control and orders of the Master.”75 In fullness, the regulation
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continues that they must obey the Captain “or Officer in command for the time being.”76 Each of
the officers’ sections within the regulation manual is preceded by a section describing how they
will keep watch and be assigned temporary command at sea in lieu of the Captain.77 Because any
of them could be expected to take charge of the boat from time to time throughout the course of
the voyage, it was critical that each officer be up to the task. Accidents, even minor ones, usually
caused demotion for the officer found responsible.
Demotions for cause were used in the aftermath of accidents where guilt could be clearly
placed. Collisions were not at all uncommon during the Troup years since accurate local charting
and forecasting were still developing, as were ship-to-ship and ship-to-land communication
technologies. A BCCS insurance claims book shows seventy-nine entries from 1929-1931 for
events that could have generated claims, although it was noted many did not.78 When such an
event was severe enough to warrant an investigation into its cause by management, the key factor
that determined whether personnel actions were taken was the officer in question’s judgement.
After an accident in 1919 in which the officer in charge, Mr. Palmer, struck land while
navigating through Seymour Narrows at night during low tide, management found that even
though the Captain had left written orders to be woken up for the passage, Palmer had merely
called for him once and then continued to command the ship. This earned him a demotion to
Second Officer since “he should have definitely satisfied himself whether or not the Master was
going to take charge of the vessel, in view of his instructions to be called for that purpose.”79
While Palmer’s demotion was for multiple errors—the unsafe navigation of the ship stemming

76

Regulations, 3. Emphasis added.
Regulations, 10-11.
78
“Insurance Claims 1930,” December 1929-December 1931, Business Records, BCCS Fonds, Vancouver Maritime
Museum, Vancouver.
79
C. D. Neroutsos to J. W. Troup, August 11, 1919, folder 15, box 5, EMC.
77

30
from failure to get the captain—it only took a single mistake for a captain to face losing stripes.
When Princess Royal was caught in an unexpectedly strong current while turning and landed
bow-first at its pier in Vancouver, Captain Anderson was found at fault. Even though
management found that “the Master has a very good record and has always heretofore used care
and good judgement when handling vessels,” because he “did not do so on this occasion”
Anderson found himself “disrated to First Officer and will not be given command again for some
time.”80
In none of these cases, however, were the affected Officers dismissed. While dismissals
were certainly possible for other causes, such as intoxication, accidents seem to have been
accepted as one of the standard hazards of the sea. Even in cases where it was clear that the
officer’s judgement was at fault, as with Palmer and Anderson, there were still ameliorating
circumstances. Palmer took a ship through unfamiliar waters at low tide and Anderson was
caught by a current; both failed to effectively prevent the accident, but neither was entirely
human error either. Both Troup and Neroutsos had spent time as officers in command on British
Columbian waters and understood what could go wrong.81 Both, also, were heavily involved as
managers in the design of BCCS vessels and understood their technical limitations. The Officer
on the bridge did not, after all, directly control the ship’s propulsion. He merely communicated
his instructions to the engine room, staffed by an entirely different department of the ship, and
expected them to be executed promptly.
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Chief Engineer
The Engineers, sequestered away in the engine room away not only from the rest of the
crew but the passengers too, were led by a Chief Engineer appointed by BCCS management.
Given “full charge of this important Department and staff” but still “strictly enjoined to enforce
fully all the orders of the Master,” the Chief Engineer nonetheless served as a counterweight to
the Captain.82 The Captain could not dismiss the Chief Engineer, nor was he particularly
expected to manage the Engine Department’s day-to-day affairs. The Chief Engineer was also
the only crewmember given the assigned task of drawing the Captain’s attention to their standing
orders whenever a command in “conflict with instructions from headquarters” was issued.83 The
only power that the Chief Engineer lacked as it related to administering the engine room was
“the authority to award punishment,” although he was expected to “assist in promoting the
discipline and cleanliness of the ship.”84 In all other respects, everything that pertained to
engineering was his to command.
The core function of the Chief Engineer’s job was to ensure that the correct amount of
propulsion was delivered when called for by the bridge. To this end, he was instructed to be
personally present “when entering or leaving port, or when passing through any passages or
channels” that could require special “promptitude” in responding to the wheelhouse’s
instructions.85 He was responsible, too, for all firefighting equipment throughout the vessel, a
natural fit for the head of the department whose job it was to intentionally light roaring fires
within the hull of a wooden ship.86 “Working in harmony with the other Departments” required
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close communication with the Captain in particular so that the boiler fires could be appropriately
stoked or banked to conserve fuel while still delivering the needed amount of steam.87 By
extension, the engine room’s stores—primarily equipment and fuel—were under the Chief
Engineer’s jurisdiction, including checking storage spaces like coal bunkers for stowaways.88
Outside of the immediate environs of the engine room, the Chief’s “special attention” was called
“to the fresh water and sanitary arrangements… remembering that the latter are… for the use and
convenience of passengers and crew.”89 In short, if it was particularly dirty or mechanical, the
Chief Engineer was responsible for it with his crew.

The Engine Room
Working in the engine room was a crowded, loud, hot, and dirty affair. The Engine
Department could employ anywhere from five members, Chief Engineer included, such as
aboard the old and tiny Otter, to a whopping forty-three on the modern and massive Princess
Victoria.90 Among them were not only the engineers, ranking all the way down from Chief to
Seventh Engineer often with multiple double-filled billets, but also the firemen, coal passers, and
oilers. The licensed engineers, whose “skill was rare, highly valued, and rewarded,” were at the
top of the social ladder within the department, while the less technically-savvy were looked
down upon as workers who did their labor “because they could find nothing else.”91
Every square foot given to the engine room was space that could not be used for revenue
generation, so the company was incentivized to make the compartment as small as could still be
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operational. The Engine Department’s workspace was, therefore, cramped to say the least. Pipes
and ducts through which scalding steam flowed presented constant burn hazards and, combined
with fires used to produce the steam, contributed to a hot environment. Nor could the crew
expect an immediate respite from the heat upon arriving in home port, as BCCS instructions
were that “fires must not be drawn [extinguished] before receiving permission from the
Superintendent.”92 The ships were initially coal-fired, eventually transitioning to oil-burners, and
coal dust would have been tracked throughout the compartment by the coal-passers and
firemen.93 Lubrication oil was regularly added throughout the voyage by the oilers, a job that
while “not technical or difficult,” called “for patience and fidelity.”94 Oil needed to be
continually applied because it was continually lost to burning and drainage, both of which also
contributed to a messy workplace. It is no wonder that the members of the Engineering
Department were the only ones out of the crew who had no day-to-day uniform mandate.95
The Engineering Department’s day-to-day was comprised of long days and nights. For
most of the engine room crew, their working hours while in port were 7:00 am to 5:00pm
although the Chief Engineer had the benefit of arriving at 9:00am.96 Nor did their day necessarily
end at the five o’clock hour. While away from home, the crew would be sleeping aboard the
vessel regardless, but even while docked in Victoria or Vancouver regulations required that “one
Engineer must sleep on board at night, coming on board not later than 10:00 P.M. … so that he
can be called if required.”97 The most likely cause for the engineer’s nighttime summoning
would have been a nearby fire. Fire was, after all, the greatest threat to wooden-hulled ships and
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since the vessel’s propulsion depended entirely on the action of engineers, in order to move the
boat to a position of safety away from a nearby fire, one would have to be aboard to move it.
The Engineers had, arguably, a role even more important than the officer in command for
keeping the ship safe. After all, the engines were controlled directly from the engine room by its
crew, not from the bridge. Orders were relayed from the commanding officer to the engine room
by way of a telegraph dial, but it was the engineers of the watch who executed the order. To that
end, BCCS rules were clear about expectations for alertness. Regulations required that “the
Engineers of the watch are on no account whatever to leave their posts until relieved,” and “must
be on or near the driving platform” when “in places of intricate navigation.”98 An even more
restrictive rule was in place for assistant engineers, who “must always be near to the starting
platform, to be in readiness to stop the engines if required.”99 Safety walkthroughs were
mandatory at the beginning and ending of every watch, with positive instructions to “inspect all
journals, bearings, etc., and see that all watertight doors ARE FREE FROM
OBSTRUCTION.”100 The only other place in the regulation manual in which all capitals are
used also pertained to the engine room. It demanded that “WHEN A GAUGE GLASS IS
BROKEN, IT MUST BE REPAIRED AT ONCE.”101 That BCCS management only felt the need
to draw employees’ attention to safety instructions so dramatically in the Engineering
Department’s section emphasizes their safety-critical role aboard the ship. Ultimately, the ship
did not move without the engineers, firemen, coal passers, and oilers. In motion and at rest,
however, there were a plethora of other tasks that needed doing, and not by the Engineering
Department.

98

Regulations, 14.
Regulations, 14. Emphasis added.
100
Regulations, 14. All capitals original.
101
Regulations, 15.
99

35
The Deck Department
Running a boat requires more than navigation and movement, however, it also requires
deck hands. While the Captain and Officer were technically also members of the Deck
Department, Able Bodied Seamen (typically abbreviated “ABs”), Quartermasters, Lookouts, and
Watchmen composed the rest. Expected to be “intelligent and reliable men” with “experience in
their particular duties before joining the service of the Company,” very little else is said in the
company’s manual about them or their “particular duties.”102 Most of the evidence for what each
of these Deck Department members did comes from descriptions of other classes of
crewmembers. Lookouts, for instance, were involved in keeping a literal eye out for hazards as
the ship navigated since Captains were instructed to note who the lookouts on duty were in the
event of an accident.103 Quartermasters, too, were named in the log after a collision or grounding,
though since they were generally “without responsibility” for the safety of the vessel, this would
have been for later questioning about the correct weight distribution of the cargo they
managed.104 The watchmen supervised the ship overnight. It was to them that the engineer
sleeping on board in port would report and it was they who “report[ed] hourly to the Officer of
the watch on the Bridge” about the status of the Saloon at night.105
For everything else, there were the Able Bodied Seamen. Stereotyped as “a jumble of
unskilled and none-too-bright laborers recruited from across the world for an arduous but
predictable work-life,” ABs were given the tasks that were too menial for the officers, not
mechanical enough for the Engineers, and also not direct customer service.106 The diminished
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skill of ABs in the age of steam as opposed to the age of sail is due largely to the centralization
of knowledge by those responsible for navigation and propulsion, the same Officers and
Engineers who directed ABs’ labor.107 They handled the lines (ropes) and were the ones to
physically turn the helm, albeit always under the direction of the Officer of the Watch.108 They
loaded and took off the mails, freight, and express.109 ABs trained weekly during fire drills and
boat drills, keeping their skills sharp for the event of an emergency.110 No other class of
crewmember being specifically tasked with the maintenance and cleaning of the hull and outer
decks, this unending labor also fell to the seamen. Despite the requirement to have previous
experience, the fact that the position could be done by someone with minimal knowledge made it
attractive for workaways, people who exchanged work for passage. After all, anyone who could
reasonably take direction and wrap a line around a cleat could make themselves useful aboard
the vessel, freeing up the more technically savvy ABs for tasks which required their particular
skills. While the practice was discouraged, serving as an AB as a workaway was certainly
possible.111 For instance, ten of the people lost in the sinking of the Princess Sophia were on the
boat as workaways from Skagway, despite the requirement that justification for their presence be
given.112 The management to whom these decisions needed to be justified, however, was not
estranged from the actual practice of sailing.

107

Eric Sager, Ships and Memories, 59.
J. W. Troup to D. C. Coleman, June 20, 1919, folder 12, box 10, EMC.
109
J. W. Troup to D. C. Coleman, June 20, 1919, folder 12, box 10, EMC.
110
Regulations, 6.
111
Regulations, 20.
112
F. F. W. Lowle, “Passengers on ‘Princess Sophia’ when lost on Vanderbilt Reef,” October 29, 1918, folder 2, box
5, EMC. The loss of Princess Sophia is discussed at further length in Chapter Two.
108

37
Conclusion
Running the vessels of the BCCS required the dedicated efforts of their crews. Captain
Troup enjoyed the powers and privileges of management, setting the company’s course and
speed as it grew. The Officers received the spotlight of social recognition, but also bore the
burden of responsibility, none more so than the Master. Engine room staff, cramped and
cloistered, implemented the Officers’ orders for propulsion and ensured the proper working order
of fuel- and grease-hungry steam-powered machinery. Around them all worked the Able Bodied
Seamen. The ABs bobbed here and there around the ship, completing the small tasks that
comprised the rest of the sea’s working symphony. But just as customers do not board a boat to
go nowhere, companies do not operate ships with no passengers or cargo. A group even more
diverse than the ship-runners were given the many-faceted task of serving the customer.
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Chapter Two
Serving The Customer
“. . . must endeavor to give every satisfaction to the passengers, and his attention to their
comfort must be unceasing.”
– Regulations for the Navigation of the British Columbia Coast Service Steamships of the
Canadian Pacific Railway Company

While not entirely the typical process of boarding due to a late dinner in Chinatown, this
recollection set in 1910 is an amusing overview of the passenger’s experience on one of
Canadian Pacific Railway’s (CPR) British Columbia Coast Service (BCCS) steamer. In it, the
unnamed author and his brother Emil had just (literally) run across Vancouver in order to make
their midnight sailing on time. Joined by “two other chaps [who] were thundering along behind
us,” the four found a solitary member of the crew who informed them “that the PRINCESS
MAY would be detained until three in the morning, and that most of the passengers had retired to
their staterooms.” Not yet ready for bed, they availed themselves of the male-exclusive social
space: the smoking room. The next morning, the author and Emil were roused by a gongwielding crewman announcing breakfast, at which they saw that “most of the passengers
appeared to be English couples, charmingly sedate and proper,” especially those at the Captain’s
table. After breakfast, they note that Princess May was freshly painted and adorned with gulls
“waiting for a handout from the Ship’s scullery after meals.” Trips to both the “parlor” (likely
what is called the Social Hall on ships’ plans) and Smoking Room occupied their morning before
being called to lunch. Upon arrival in Prince Rupert the next day, the author notes that both the
Captain and First Officer were on the bridge for docking. A three-hour visit to town concluded
with the 30-minute-warning whistle from Princess May. A late-returning passenger (the RCMP
Constable nicknamed “Spike” whom they had met their first evening aboard) brought the vessel
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back to the dock after pushing off. The voyage continues unimpeded from there to Skagway,
where the brothers disembark.1
Notice each place the crew touches the brothers’ story. The first is the crewman who
greeted them on the gangplank and informed them of the ship’s detention. While the story is set
in 1910 and it would be entirely plausible for this delay to be due to the loading of freight,2 the
fact that the author reports only a lone member of crew and not a bustling dock crammed with
stevedores indicates some other cause, like perhaps a late mail delivery. The next morning, the
brothers are gonged awake by a Porter, waited upon by Stewards, and served a breakfast made
by the Cooks while admiring the Captain holding court with the primmest and properest of the
passengers. They are amused by seagulls that were apparently habituated to expect leftovers
from generous Cooks or Stewards. They utilize two public spaces continuously cleaned and
maintained for them by the crew. Two Officers guided the ship into port. They are summoned
back to the boat by a warning whistle blown by the bridge crew. The Bridge Officer (one would
assume the Captain, given his presence for docking) orders the ship back to the pier rather than
leave a single passenger behind. At every point, the journey was made enjoyable by the labors of
the crew.
BCCS was nothing without the customers it served. Serving those customers were a crew
of predominately white men with many different roles to play. Freight workers were routinely
vilified by the Passenger Department for delaying ships’ schedules. Nonetheless, the Freight
Department was, in ways, more in tune with the larger needs of CPR as a whole and were
therefore willing to make tradeoffs that negatively impacted BCCS specific service. Even still,
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the Coast Service was remembered most for the luxurious experience it provided to the
passengers who enjoyed it. Stewards, Porters, Pursers, and Cooks all had a part in maintaining
the company’s top-notch service afloat. Ultimately, regardless of whether one was a shipper only
interested in the movement of their freight or one of a pair of brothers trying to get to Skagway,
the employees of the British Columbia Coast Steamship Service would do most everything
within their power to serve their customers.

Freighting
The Coast Service fulfilled many industrial functions, among them, a transporter of bulk
freight. Every ship was designed with at least some freighting capacity, though this competed
directly with the vessel’s passenger accommodations. The internal competition between freight
and passenger departments did not stop at marine architecture. Cargo activities had an
unfortunate habit of delaying vessels and delayed vessels meant irritable customers. During a
meeting, BCCS Manager James Troup argued that “the passenger business was being injured at
times by the crowding of the boats with undesirable freight, thereby delaying them beyond
schedule.”3 In response, “the Freight Department contended that it was necessary to do this in
order to keep our various customers along the Coast in line, and in many cases, to protect the
Rail interests.”4 Keeping the company’s interests “in line” meant to keep the business with
CPR’s steamship line and thereby “protect the Rail interests” on the other side of the Strait of
Georgia. BCCS was, after all, a division of the Canadian Pacific Railway, not a wholly
independent company. The Coast Service’s freight business was linked more closely with rail
than the passenger side because while there was a significant local passenger traffic between
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Vancouver, Victoria, and Seattle, the shipments of cargo rarely terminated at any of these ports.
Given this, the Freight Department was more sensitive to the larger picture of BCCS’ place
within the broader CPR network. Nonetheless, they acknowledged that bulk freight did cause
delays.5 The rest of those present at the meeting seem to have accepted their admission of
culpability and their promise that cargo operations would be more closely monitored and even
“curtailed where it was going to delay the boats,” despite their misgivings about prioritizing
passenger traffic at the expense of CPR’s other interests.6
Freight Department managers’ concern with “curtailing” cargo activities was not without
basis. Five years earlier, in 1911, freight crews were being pushed hard to load ships to capacity.
For instance, the Princess Adelaide left Vancouver “at 1:00 o’clock [pm], arrive[d] at Victoria at
6:[00] p.m., and from that time until midnight, as many men as can work properly, are engaged
every minute of the time in unloading and loading freight from the return trip.”7 The breakneck
speed being requested of the men was, however, still not enough. Because passenger baggage
and contracted mails (along with “quantities of bulky scenery in connection with the show
companies moving from Victoria to Vancouver”) took priority over common freight, Troup
lamented that it was ultimately “necessary to leave freight lying on the wharves almost daily, at
both ends of the route.”8 “This, of course,” continued the captain, “creates dissatisfaction among
the shippers,” and one would easily infer that it added stress to the freight bosses as well.9
Against the backdrop of this history, it is little wonder that the Freight Department pushed back
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against accusations that they were delaying the boats for no reason. They did an essential service
for the company as a whole but were only noticed when things went wrong. The passenger
department, on the other hand, was responsible for delivery the royal treatment that the Princess
Line was known for.

Welcome Aboard
“My idea of the people served by the British Columbia Coast Steamship fleet,” wrote C.
B. Foster in a memo to CPR leadership, “is that they want, first and above all, a dependable
service, and, secondly, they want a good service, and after that they want a service as cheap as
they can get it.”10 While fares may have changed with the times, BCCS was unwavering in
providing a good, dependable experience for their passengers. Dependability arose in part from
standardization.
Just as the officers and engineers did, customer-facing crewmembers also had to abide by
the Regulations for the Navigation of the British Columbia Coast Service Steamships.11 Among
those rules that affected their daily experience were:
89. Pursers will see that their Assistants comport themselves in a gentlemanly
manner….
105. The use of improper language is at all times strictly prohibited….
108. The Chief Steward, on shipping employees, will see that they have a
sufficient supply of clothing to make them appear neat and tidy. They must
always wear the Company’s uniform, which consists of blue serge trousers, shell
jacket and vest of the same material, a peak cap, three white vests and a cotton
working suit … The Stewardess must wear blue and black dress, white cap and
apron….
119. The working hours in port for all employees, except cooks, employed in the
Chief Steward’s Department, will be from 7:30 A.M. until 5:30 P.M. [an undated
handwritten note amends this to 8:00 to 5:00]. On days previous to sailing and on
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Sundays, a half holiday will be permitted, but on sailing days, no shore leave will
be granted to anyone, except by permission of the Chief Steward.12
The double emphasis on “gentlemanly manner” and proper language points towards the
atmosphere that managers wanted the crew to create. These were not mere ferry boats, they were
coastal liners, elegant and refined vessels catering to an elegant and refined clientele.13 This
refinement was reflected in the crew’s attire, which could have been one of two different style of
suit depending on the task of the moment. The specific instruction to maintain three white vests,
not merely one to be worn and one in reserve, again indicates the high importance given to
“looking the part” for their guests. Maintaining the look of the rest of the ship required time,
however. Ten hour shifts in port (later reduced to nine hours) gave the crew time to keep the ship
in peak condition, and they even got the liberty of half a day off on Sundays and the day before
setting out on extended trips. Nonetheless, once out for the voyage, the requirement that the
Chief Steward give personal authorization for shore leave meant that staff were effectively tied
to the vessel until they returned to port. Uniformed, gentlemanly (or ladylike, for the
stewardesses) behavior for ten hours per day was not a bad job for British Columbians who
wanted a life on coastal waters. Conditions would even be improved as union activities made
incremental advancements to pay and hours.14
Upon boarding, guests would typically be greeted by the Purser, whose responsibility it
was to collect fares from all passengers.15 Once checked in, guests would be assisted to their
stateroom by stewards and porters, “a sufficient number” of whom were to be “on hand at all
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times” to carry luggage and guide passengers to their staterooms.16 Even once settled in, bell
boys were at all times on call to promptly attend to customers’ needs such as providing
additional linens or when dining periods were.17 Within those dining periods, passengers were
free to purchase meals at their leisure without the need to schedule a seating in advance.18
Throughout the day, guests could take in the scenery while strolling the deck, socialize in one of
the few public saloons, go ashore briefly when in port, or rest privately in their cabins, all while
the crew worked around them to clean and prepare for the next item in the itinerary.
In all, a cruise aboard a BCCS steamer was generally a pleasant and reasonably priced
affair. Despite the crew’s wages, cost of supplies, and depreciation of the luxurious ships
themselves, passengers were charged less than comparable outings elsewhere.19 After the maiden
cruise of Princess Maquinna along the west coast of Vancouver Island in 1913, Troup wrote
glowingly to his General Passenger Agent, H. W. Brodie: “The round trip rate of $24.00 for five
days’ sail, is less than board and lodging at a decent hotel… we had about half a dozen round
trippers on the “Maquinna” on her first trip, and they were more than delighted, and will, I am
sure, persuade some of their friends to go before the summer is out.”20 BCCS steamers did not
just outperform land-based hotels on price; they competed with them directly in luxuriousness as
well.
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Social Grandeur
Public areas on BCCS steamers were lavishly appointed. Besides one’s own cabin, there
were four main public areas on ships during the Troup era: the dining saloon, the social hall, the
smoking room, and the deck. The options were even more limited for women as they were not
permitted in the smoking room. This must have been particularly disappointing as the smoking
room was designed to be the heart of social life aboard ship. Aboard Princess Mary, for instance,
the smoking room was the only place with both public seating and views—the dining saloon was
available only for meals and the “inside saloon” was just that: inside.21
Men’s smoking rooms also received special attention in their decorations. Princess
Kathleen’s was particularly known for its First Nations-inspired art. Intricate totem poles and
figures carved in traditional poses ornament the space at eye level while a double row of small,
decorative buttresses created a stepping effect at the ceiling.22 To their partial credit, BCCS
management spent several weeks researching coastal art in correspondence with the Victoria
Memorial Museum in Ottawa (not to be confused with the British Columbia Museum in
Victoria).23 Despite Troup writing to a museum official “I am quite in accord with your views
that we should do all we can to keep this North American Indian art from going completely out
of existence, and out of memory,”24 it apparently escaped his own memory that First Nations
artists would have been better experts on their own cultural heritage. While wishing them to be
remembered, Troup also seems to have been ambivalent about the merit of Indigenous designs,
referring to them in another letter as “British Columbia Coast ‘art.’”25 Nonetheless, the
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appropriated designs were incorporated by Scottish craftsmen into Princess Kathleen’s most
important male social space.
While undoubtedly beautiful, decorations required meticulous cleaning by the crew. The
outstretched wings of a thunderbird, the projecting snout of a bear, the brim of a human figure’s
cedar hat, and each of the over a hundred buttresses were all horizontal surfaces that would
require regular dusting. Leather upholstery of the booths and chairs needed maintenance.
Constant sea-spray against windowpanes—not to mention the occasional gift from a seagull—
had to be cleaned or else the male passengers would lose their view. Perhaps most tedious of all
for the stewards, while the center of the room was tiled, the seating areas were carpeted, allowing
tobacco ash to collect and be ground in under foot.26 The crew themselves were not permitted to
contribute to the carpet’s ash collection, being specifically prohibited them from smoking either
“in the passenger saloons or while on duty.”27 There was, however, required to be a watchman in
the afternoons as this was a time of peak use and the risk of fire was of paramount concern.28
Whether he enjoyed being surrounded by secondhand smoke likely depended on the individual
watchman, of course.

Luxury Accommodations
A majority of the ship was unobserved by an afternoon watchman, however, being taken
up by passenger cabins which generally slept one or two people each. The most luxurious option
was the Cabin de Luxe. The room featured a four post bed complete with curtains, a two-tiered
nightstand, ornately upholstered armchair, straight-back chair with embroidered cushion, radiator
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set into a mock fireplace mantlepiece, basin with taps for both hot and cold water, electric lamps,
and a doorway onto a room with tiled floor that appears to step up into a lavatory shared with
another Cabin de Luxe on the other side.29 Here, again, are objects of distinct luxury which
required constant maintenance by the crew. The wooden surfaces required dusting and polishing,
the bedcurtains and linens laundering, the fabric upholstery periodic mending, and the shared
bathroom daily cleaning. Balanced against these constant needs were other touches that gave the
room a homier feeling but required minimal upkeep from the crew, such as a portrait of a young
woman on the wall and a vase of dried flowers on the mantle.30 Throughout the voyage,
regardless of which cabin they had booked, passengers had free access to paper and envelopes
through the Purser’s office that they could mail when the ship made port calls.31 This, of course,
was not just good customer service but smart marketing. BCCS relied in part on word-of-mouth
referrals among the wealthier residents of BC, as evidenced by Troup’s hope after the maiden
voyage of Princess Maquinna that those who went on the first cruise would “persuade some of
their friends to go before the summer is out.”32
With the exception of the senior officers,33 crew quarters were not nearly as comfortable.
When they appeared on ships’ deck plans at all, it was simply as a labeled room—there were no
berths marked in, no wash basins, no closets or lockers, all of which suggests that the spaces
were flexible (alternatively described as “impermanent”) to the shifting needs and size of the
crew. Temporary accommodations like folding cots or hammocks did not engender the same
kind of morale that the Purser’s or Chief Steward’s private staterooms did. Unlike the
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passengers, the crew did not have access to the ship’s supply of stationary and were generally
required to stay aboard at port calls even if they had wanted to send home a letter.34

The Purser
While the Master was responsible for the ship as a whole, the man charged with
maintaining impeccable customer service and looking after the company’s business interests
aboard was the Purser. Having “charge of all moneys and tickets collected, and be[ing] held
responsible for a proper accounting of the same,” the Purser’s chief duty to the company was
fiduciary.35 As he was responsible for managing the entirety of the ship’s revenue, it naturally
followed that the Purser was also responsible to comply with periodic audits of the same.36 In
addition, BCCS regulations charged that pursers were accountable “to see that all the ship’s
papers, Bills of Health, Customs Documents, Way Bills for cargo, etc.” were on board, that the
Articles of Agreement seamen signed when joining the crew were followed, and for completing
monthly payrolls.37 The Articles of Agreement in particular were critical legal documents for the
company. In most jurisdictions during the first decades of the twentieth century, sailors signed
away their right to abandon their employment when they agreed to Articles.38 The Purser’s
custody of these documents reflected his position as head of the company’s financial affairs
afloat. The public, however, most likely knew the purser first and foremost as their greeter, since
he was responsible for the “collection of transportation,” (i.e., fares).39
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Because of their customer-facing role, Pursers were some of the most recognizable
crewmen aboard the ship besides the Captain and Officers. Their highly-visible position meant
that they had a positive instruction that “whilst on duty[, Pursers] are expected to appear in
uniform, neat and clean” and “are expected to be courteous to all passengers and to see that all
members of their staff are likewise courteous.”40 Not only responsible for their own staff, pursers
were instructed to “at once investigate and report to the Captain any complaints which may be
made to him by passengers; also any irregularities which may come under his notice, such as
incivility on the part of the employees, want of cleanliness in the cabins, or bad and careless
attendance.”41 This visibility and responsibility for the customer experience is borne out by
American marine transportation mogul Joshua Green’s recollection that it was the “genial way
your pursers and officers have met us at the gang plank” that impressed him the most.42 Note that
the Pursers are mentioned first and is singled out for special praise; even the ship’s skipper is
merged into the collective “and officers.”43 To passengers, even one as intimately involved in the
shipping industry as Joshua Green, the Purser stood out and the Officers faded into the backdrop,
despite their higher rank and responsibility. It is perhaps unsurprising that customers would
remember best the staff whose job it was to serve their needs directly, but memorable though he
may have been, the Purser was but one of those staff.
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Chief Steward
The Purser’s most important lieutenant was the Chief Steward. The list of spaces aboard
ship for which he was responsible was a long one, including “all saloons, staterooms, secondclass accommodations, storerooms, mess rooms, pantry, galley, bakery and furnishings.”44 As if
that were not enough, responsibility for the food preparation areas also put him in charge of the
“Victualling Stores,” that is, the ship’s food supply.45 Part innkeeper, part maître d’hôtel, the
Chief Steward’s duties kept him occupied for the entire voyage. As passengers embarked, he
assisted the purser in allotting berths and supervised the process of then getting guests to their
staterooms.46 Per regulations, “his attention to their comfort must be unceasing.”47 Part of that
unceasing attention was the daily inspection of quarters to be completed with the Captain, in part
to ensure their cleanliness, but also to verify “that heat, light, water, and ventilation [were]
furnished in all portions of the ship.”48
While his responsibilities touched on “all portions of the ship,” the Chief Steward’s other
main focus besides the staterooms was the dining saloon. While the Head Cook kept order within
the kitchen and its crew in practice, officially, the Chief Steward was responsible for the vessel’s
mealtime operations. Regulation 106 ordered that “the Chief Steward will devote a portion of his
time to the galleys, and see that nothing is wasted, that the Cooks take proper care of the cooking
utensils, and that they keep the galleys, sculleries, etc., perfectly clean and tidy.”49 This oversight
of the “proper care of the cooking utensils” was, perhaps, overreaching on the part of the
company, since the utensils were furnished by the cooks themselves, as described below. The

44

Regulations, 19.
Regulations, 19.
46
Regulations, 20.
47
Regulations, 19.
48
Regulations, 20 and 23.
49
Regulations, 20.
45

51
Chief Steward was also responsible for coordinating mealtimes for the junior officers, even to
the extent that he was in charge of their specific assigned seats.50 Finally, the Chief Steward was
to make a sweep of the vessel for lost items when calling at ports, delivering them to the agent
ashore.51

Fine Dining
Dining aboard BCCS vessels was no mean affair, and it started with setting their tables.
Typically sat at long tables that accommodated several parties at once, diners afloat would not
want for any of the luxuries that were available at restaurants ashore. The silverware for the
dining saloon aboard Princess Patricia, for instance, included electroplated table knives, cheese
knives, fruit knives, fruit forks, table forks, dessert forks, pickle forks, dessert spoons, table
spoons, tea spoons, egg spoons, coffee spoons, jam spades, butter knives, two sizes of bar
spoons, ice tongs, sugar tongs, nutcrackers, mustard spoons, and cheese scoops. Accompanying
this expanse of cutlery were oval cracker trays, cracker baskets, nut & raisin dishes, water
pitchers, finger bowls (gold lined), bar pitcher, champagne tap, oval entrée dishes with covers
and handles, cream ewers, sugar bowls, tea pots, sugar dredgers (for dusting extra powdered
sugar on confections), champagne buckets, jam stands, syrup jugs, mustard pots, bread trays,
fruit stands, and butter dishes with drainers. The “American Bar” got its own consignment of
cocktail shakers, strainers, ice tools, bitters corks, sugar basin (and crushers), and a fourcompartment stand for coffee beans. Even the Officers’ Mess mainly duplicated the dining
saloon but with lessened quantities ordered and three notable additions: bottle cruets, vinegar
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bottles, and napkin rings.52 Polishing all of this silver, ironing the white tablecloths, and setting
the saloons for service were the Stewards. This was not a line that accepted half measures when
it came to luxury. The fully appointed dining saloon was equaled only by their menus.
One was spoiled for choice when dining aboard a Princess steamer. Each meal was a
multi-course affair that would be similar to what was found ashore, and each course typically had
at least two options for guests to choose between. Dinner service for October 2, 1912 on Princess
Sophia, for instance, offered:
Hors d’Oerves
Queen Olives. Salted Almonds.
Soup
Mutton Broth.
Fish
Boiled Cod & Parsley Sauce.
Entrees
Haricot of Ox Tail. Princess Fritters & Sweet Sauce.
Hot Joints
Roast Rib of Beef & Horseradish. Roast Leg of Pork & Apple Sauce.
Boiled Ox Tongue & Vegetables.
Vegetables
Stewed Carrots in Cream. Mashed & Boiled Potatoes.
Sweets
Tapioca Pudding. Custard Pie.
Apples. Oranges. Cheese. Pickles
Tea. Coffee.53
With six main courses to choose from accompanied by all the fixings, dinner on Princess Sophia
was no beggar’s feast. Lunch and breakfast menus were equally ambitious. One lunch gave the
choice between fried halibut, loin steak with mushrooms, fricassee of chicken, macaroni au
gratin, or veal cutlets for hot selections and roast beef, roast mutton, York ham, ox tongue,
corned pork, corned beef, and chicken in aspic offered cold.54 If one was not yet full, the same
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lunch provided coconut custard, blueberry pie, wine jelly with whipped cream, and lemon ice
cream for dessert.55 At breakfast, one could expect three to seven different preparations of fruit,
three to five cereals, several cold fish and meat options, buckwheat cakes, hot cakes, toast, corn
bread, and around a dozen hot cooked-to-order options with tea, coffee, or cocoa to drink.56 All
of these meals were prepared aboard in cramped galleys by the cooks, discussed in the section
below.
Above and beyond the food they advertised, the menus themselves were attractive
features of the meal service. Playbill-sized and appearing to be handwritten by members of the
crew, each menu featured some kind of ornamentation or cartoon. Sometimes, the decorative
features were predictable, such as clusters of holly leaves bordering the page for Christmas
Dinner.57 Other times, one found the a cartoon of a devilish figure looming over a corpulent,
suited man with cigar in mouth and lower half in flames who declares: “Mein got! but vot a pot
of money it must cost to heat this place.”58 Other humorous items include a drawing of a chicken
over the caption “if ‘the good die young’ why is it I am such an old HEN?” and a schoolmaster
having just finished whipping the hindquarters of a cowlick-haired boy above the words “the
little things we have to bare [sic].”59 In a foray towards politics, one dinner menu showed a fezwearing, nauseous-looking figure whose age is unclear—he has the proportions and size of a
child but his mouth is lined and eyes bordered by wrinkles—who smokes from a hookah while
seated cross-legged on a cushion. The caption reads: “Another rising in Turkey,” which may
refer either to some news-of-the-day unrest in Asia Minor, or perhaps to the youth’s apparently
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rising lunch after too much smoke.60 Children peeping through life rings seem to be a common
theme in late July, with two separate cartoons of the same subject appearing around a year
apart.61 While it is unclear precisely who among the crew was responsible for creating the menus
and their cartoons, the varying hand in which they were written indicates it was likely a
rotational duty. The menus seem also to have been a creative outlet for staff, a way to
personalize their service and express themselves professionally—that is, if an apparently German
capitalist residing, apparently, in the Christian Hell could be considered “professional.” Even so,
the pushing of such professional boundaries also demonstrate that the crew was secure in their
positions and comfortable with where limits could be safely expanded, even while maintaining a
respectable environment for the elite.
Elaborate as they were, meals aboard BCCS vessels remained competitively priced. Even
as late as 1918, passengers were not charged more than a full dollar per meal for one of the most
labor-intensive parts of the fleet’s service. The apparent strain this caused on the company’s
balance sheet was commented on when Manager Troup wrote to General (i.e., Head) Passenger
Agent H. W. Brodie that “the Vice-President [D. C. Coleman] is pressing me constantly. He
points out that our revenue is not increasing in the same proportion as our expenditures” and
recommended that the lunch charge be advanced to $1.00 and dinner be $1.25.62 In comparison
to dining services offered on CPR trains and at their hotels, Troup felt that that the price “would
not be excessive.”63 Clearly, Coleman’s pressure worked as by June 1920 the prices had been set
at $1.00 for breakfast, $1.25 for lunch, and $1.50 for dinner, all even higher than what had been
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requested two years earlier.64 In 1920, however, it was CPR Vice President Grant Hall pushing
for a $0.25 increase to both the breakfast and dinner charges; after all, “our meals are very high
class and nobody will criticize their quality.”65 Our meals have always been a great
advertisement for us,” wrote Troup in 1920 arguing that they were of greater value in generating
business than generating additional revenue.66
The company’s meals were also of use in deflecting unwanted attention at times. In 1914,
Troup was forced to address upper management’s concerns over the number of free “meals”
given out by the Coast Service. After investigating, Troup explained:
We find that the Chief Stewards have been over-zealous in reporting meals … in
order to make a showing for themselves, and in this way the statement of the
number of free meals on board of the boats, is more or less of an exaggeration….
The Immigration Officers, who stand on the gangplanks at Vancouver at
night, and who are there until 11:00 o’clock, have the privilege of going to the
dining saloon and getting a cup of coffee, and possibly a little cold lunch. The
Stewards report this as a meal.
At Seattle, there is an American Customs Officer who stands by the ship
during the entire time she lies in port. He has been given his breakfast since we
have been running to Seattle, and I have no doubt it has saved us many a
complaint for some technical violation of the letter of the law.67
While CPR lawyers may have cringed at the thought the company was effectively bribing
customs officers with breakfast, it is difficult to disagree with Troup’s logic. American officials
got an in-kind bonus from BCCS to supplement their government salaries and the company was
extended professional courtesy to fix issues prior to a citation; the arrangement was a win-win.
Some staff were also given access to free meals above and beyond their usual victualling as
members of the crew. “The Night Ticket Taker at Victoria,” wrote Troup, “is allowed a cup of
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coffee” and senior officers could “on occasion” bring aboard a guest who got meals gratis.68 It is
unclear precisely which member of the crew made the decision regarding who was given free
food. It seems likely that the Chief Steward could have claimed responsibility if he wished—
after all, it was he who reported the meals—but it also seems that once the practice was
established for certain people, it was allowed to continue without question. Certainly, no member
of the Steward’s Department was likely to have interfered with providing food to a guest of one
of Officer’s rank; instead, as seems to have been done “over-zealously,” they simply reported the
meal and informed their colleagues in the galley that another plate was needed.

Chinese Cooks
Cloistered in small, purpose-built galleys, the crew members responsible for these
phenomenal meals were the cooks, all of whom were of Chinese descent if not first-generation
Canadians themselves. “They are,” wrote Neroutsos to upper management, “a hard-working,
loyal body of men, and are largely responsible for the good name that we hold for service on
these steamers.”69 The permanence of Chinese crewmen in the galley, and their tendency not to
complain about their accommodations, was literally built into the design of the vessels. Across
the globe—at least in the corners where the Union Jack held sway—quarters for Asian seamen
were routinely more restricted than their white counterparts, and BCCS no different.70 Captain
Neroutsos reported that “the galleys in our vessels are considerably cramped compared with
kitchen accommodation in hotels and restaurants.”71 They were so cramped, in fact, that white
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crews unaccustomed to the tight spaces “would be considerably dissatisfied with [the] ships’
galleys, and would experience a great deal of difficulty in turning out proper meals.”72 While
Neroutsos is likely right that white crews would be dissatisfied with the accommodations, that
does not mean that Chinese crews necessarily were satisfied. He seems to conflate being
accustomed with and accepting the situation with actually approving of it. He also ignores the
fact that BCCS chose to design their ships with small kitchens in part because management
banked on them being continually staffed with Chinese cooks.
The pay due to Chinese crewmembers was a perennial consideration for BCCS
management. Because British Columbia had the largest total population of Asian immigrants,
nearly 51,000 by 1931, it also had the greatest number of Asian workers in the labor force.73
While their percentage share of the population actually fell from 1901 to 1931 despite nearly
tripling in absolute numbers, they still constituted a significant demographic group within British
Columbian society.74 The economic dynamics this created sometimes needed explaining to upper
management based in Winnipeg and Montreal. Responding to push back on his request to pay
bonuses to the cooks, Troup wrote back “it seems like pretty high rates to be paying Chinese, but
these proposed rates are not out of proportion with rates paid here generally to Chinese in other
lines of work.”75 He was successful in securing the “high rates” for his employees, and paying
bonuses in lieu of raising regular wages became not only normal operating procedure for BCCS
but one “the Chinese are quite proud of.”76 Stable, comparatively reasonable pay such as what
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was earned by Coast Service employees was undoubtedly welcome in the burgeoning Chinese
communities of Victoria and Vancouver, and quite unlike the incomes available to them in other
industries.77
Their stability in employment was particularly valuable to Chinese crewmembers as
flourishing “Chinatowns” in both Victoria and Vancouver consolidated and used their
communities’ capital investments to create enclaves with, as historian Jean Barman puts it, “a
comparable range of services to those enjoyed by others in the rest of the town.”78 Since one of
the benefits to serving in the coastwise fleet as opposed to a transoceanic service was the
privilege of returning home regularly, if not nightly, the consistent influx of money was
undoubtedly welcome. Even while supporting their segregated enclaves, Chinese cooks working
for BCCS were, by the very nature of their integrated employment, forging relationships with
their white coworkers and supervisors. As maritime labor historian Leon Fink rightly notes, “sea
labor functioned through the decades … as a forum for interethnic and interracial contact.”79
These experiences started to change perspectives, especially the perspectives of BCCS managers,
resulting in a level of respect for their Chinese employees that was surprising for the time, which
in turn reinforced sustained intercommunal contacts.80

Shore Agents
Just as crewmembers’ employment afloat affected their communities ashore, the
passenger experience before ever stepping onto the gang plank was a critical part of BCCS
operations. To elevate their shoreside service, the company invested in terminals and deployed
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agents to certain key ports at which the Coast Service called. Agents would do everything from
work the public counter to complete monthly reports to acquire customers.81 Juneau agent F. F.
W. Lowle, for instance, expressed regret at the low passenger count coming from his port,
indicating that these shoreside employees were also in charge of drumming up business, not
merely responding to it.82 Because of their multifaceted role, agents could feel pulled in several
directions at once. Lowle commented that in addition to Troup, agents in Alaska felt that they
were also responsible to the Passenger Traffic and Freight Traffic department heads.83 Of the
three to whom agents reported, Troup was naturally the final say. Indeed, passing word to and
implementing directions from Victoria—thereby giving the boss the ability to have his say—was
one of the shore agent’s most important duties. This was particularly the case in emergencies.
In the era when rapid communication methods were still being developed, Victoria was
often unable to respond to crises further afield. Agents’ physical locations meant that they were
placed to coordinate emergency responses on behalf of the company. They were within wireless
range of distressed vessels but could also make use of land-based telegraph systems to relay
information back to headquarters and receive instructions from the same. For the CPR Agent in
Juneau, F. F. W. Lowle, emergency management became a tragically large part of his duties in
1918.
Highlighting the shoreside agent’s role as a link in the chain of communication back to
headquarters, Lowle’s unexpected duties as an emergency coordinator began in March. On
March 9, 1918, the Pacific Steamship Company’s Admiral Evans ran aground in Hawk Inlet near
Juneau. Lowle wasted no time in dispatching BCCS’s Princess Sophia to assist, doing so even
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before he had received any instructions from Troup.84 While the decision to send Princess
Sophia was commended, Lowle had waited until the next morning to cable back to Victoria that
he had done so. “You should have wired us immediately [after] the arrangement was made,”
Troup complained; “Everybody on the Coast had the information that the ‘Sophia’ had gone to
the relief of the ‘Evans’ long before we had it.”85 Happily for the crew and passengers of
Admiral Evans, the worst that happened after its grounding was Troup’s frustration with Lowle.
When Princess Sophia grounded later the same year in October, all initial indications were that
the incident would have the same result. Instead, Princess Sophia became, and over a hundred
years later remains, the worst maritime disaster along the Pacific coast of North America.
At 2:15 am on October 24, 1918, in blizzard conditions, Princess Sophia radioed “ashore
Vanderbilt Reef send all possible help.”86 Juneau Agent Lowle was aware less than two hours
later, asking Princess Sophia’s Captain Locke via wireless: “Have you any instructions to give
me?” Locke responded, simply: “None.”87 Captain Locke’s answer was indicative of his calm
reaction to the grounding. Locke believed “Sophia was perfectly safe,” and the skippers of
vessels responding to the emergency (including USS Cedar, USS Peterson, and fishing vessel
King & Winge) agreed that the ship was “seemingly solidly fastened” atop the reef and in no
immediate danger.88 Nonetheless, Lowle and Locke communicated for the rest of the day to
coordinate getting all available boats on scene to take the passengers off as soon as seas
calmed.89 Both men communicated with Troup throughout the day as well, but this was
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hampered somewhat when a telegraph cable apparently broke during the ongoing storm and
message traffic had to be rerouted via wireless stations.90 The situation seemed optimistic enough
that Lowle was able to take time between communicating with Locke and Troup to arrange
accommodations for the passengers in Juneau (including at several private houses) where they
could wait for Princess Alice to arrive and provide onward travel.91 Despite an unsuccessful
attempt at 4:00 am to get the passengers transferred to USS Cedar, October 25 passed much the
same as the day before. Lowle, Locke, and Troup messaged each other every few hours, a small
fleet of vessels from Juneau stood by waiting for the water to calm enough to safely approach,
and despite a broken steam main cutting power to the ship, everyone seemed in reasonable
spirits.92 Lowle’s evening message to Troup at 6:00 pm reported that Princess Sophia was still
“resting easily” on the reef but they remained “unable to take off passengers [on] account [of]
strong north wind.” Troup, Neroutsos, Lowle, Locke, those aboard Princess Sophia, and the
whole community of Juneau seem to have retired for the evening concerned but not overly
anxious about the stranded vessel, ready for fresh attempts at rescue in the morning.
There is a sudden and terrible finality to certain unexpected telegrams. The cable that
came to Bremerton Navy Yard in the early morning hours of October 26th and relayed to BCCS
headquarters in Victoria immediately after was one such message:
“Princess Sophia” driven across reef last night. No survivors. Had two hundred
sixty-eight passengers, seventy-five crew. Everything possible done here to help.
Nothing could be done owing [to] terrible rough weather. Report follows [as]
soon as possible. Radio, Juneau.93
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In light of all the other responsibilities Lowle suddenly found himself bearing, it is perhaps
merciful that he did not have the burden of informing Victoria of the loss. Nor did he own the
actions (and inactions) of Princess Sophia’s Captain Locke, Princess Alice’s Captain Slater, the
crew of USS Cedar, or any other of the vessels involved. Nonetheless, as the representative of
Canadian Pacific Railway, Lowle’s position required him to coordinate recovery efforts, answer
the inquiries of 347 sets of passengers’ family and friends, and preserve evidence for the
inevitable legal ramifications of the loss.94
The task of returning bodies to shore began quickly. By October 28, Lowle had multiple
actors involved. He reported to Troup that he had “organized with assistance of [the] governor
[a] regular fleet for search and shore patrol.”95 Even by early morning, the fleet and their
shoreside partners had met with grim success, recovering fifty bodies and identifying a majority
of them.96 By evening, that number had grown to one hundred seventy five recovered and
“nearly all” identified.97 The finalized list of passengers was sent to Victoria (and personally
transported to Juneau) by the Skagway agent on October 29.98 Again, mercifully for Agent
Lowle, it was his Skagway counterpart who needed to formally report that four infants in arms,
too young even to be charged a fare, had been aboard.99 Princess Alice, dispatched to collect the
passengers from Princess Sophia, was still steaming north after a day-long delay in Ketchikan
but its mission was now unclear.100 Troup told Lowle from Victoria that it was “impossible at
this distance to decide on best use to be made of the ‘Alice’; must therefore leave it to your
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judgment.”101 Ultimately, it was decided that Princess Sophia’s passengers would still return
home aboard Princess Alice, only in coffins instead of cabins.102
Acquiring sufficient coffins, too, was a logistical challenge. It would have been difficult
enough to furnish over three hundred caskets at once on short notice under normal conditions.
Sadly, 1918 and its attendant influenza pandemic meant that stocks were “practically
exhausted.”103 Telegrams sent to Troup within minutes of each other on October 28 conflict on
whether Undertaker Butterworth in Seattle would be sending one hundred, one hundred fifty, or
two hundred caskets, but they agree that the shipment would proceed north to Vancouver aboard
City of Seattle the next day.104 All three estimates were wrong; Butterworth sent “two expert
embalmers” to accompany two hundred seventy five coffins and necessary supplies.105
At the same time as Lowle was coordinating recovery efforts, anxious messages were
arriving both in Juneau and Victoria. Even recognizing that telegrams frequently omitted
punctuation and often did not differentiate lower- and upper-case letters, it is impossible to read
Mrs. F. L. Walsh’s cable with anything less than panic. At 5:43 pm on October 26, remarkably
quickly as news of the ship’s peril was just becoming known, she sent: “PLEASE WIRE
IMMEDIATELY COLLECT LATEST EXACT REPORT STEAMSHIP PRINCESS SOPHIA
ARE PASSENGERS SAFE.”106 Either Mr. Walsh missed his boat or Mrs. Walsh was concerned
for someone else as no one by that last name appears on the passenger roster.107
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Throughout this crisis, Lowle was again and again expected to make independent
decisions on behalf of the company. Princess Alice was sent to Juneau with the understanding
that the ship would receive further orders from Lowle personally when they arrived on scene.108
Troup told Lowle that he would “rely on your good judgement” in determining what expenses
were necessary for the recovery effort and authorized him effective carte blanche, saying that
Lowle would “be fully protected” for his financial decisions.109
The strain of these decisions, protected or not, was felt by Lowle. As early as the 28th he
was requesting “some official help” since he found himself “working night and day and taking
grave responsibility.”110 This was confirmed by the Deputy US Marshall in Juneau, who wrote a
three-page letter to General Agent Brodie in Vancouver, Lowle’s immediate superior, praising
Lowle’s actions:
Mr. Lowle never left the office for several days, going without sleep and without
his meals….
Mr. Lowle immediately sent out a number of additional boats to search for
bodies … During the short time intervening between the receipt of the news and
the actual finding of the first bodies, Mr. Lowle had accomplished wonders in
organizing identification crews form volunteers … It is hard for anyone who was
not on the ground to realize the vast amount of work that had fallen overnight on
Mr. Lowle’s shoulders, and it still harder to tell of how that work was handled. I
must also add that while all of the people of Juneau who aided in this work, did so
voluntarily, a great deal of it was accomplished through the popularity of Mr.
Lowle.111
While such praise as this shows that Lowle was clearly completely dedicated to the task at hand
and the recipient of the community’s unreserved support, such herculean efforts were not without
their emotional costs.
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Almost two months after the wreck, and still dealing with the aftermath, Lowle’s stress
finally reached a breaking point. He wrote to Troup: “I do not feel I am being treated as I should
be” and complained he was still arriving at the office early, leaving late, and even working
Sundays.112 He was handling financial matters and coordinating with local boatmen.113 He was
“attending to scores of mailed enquiries from relatives” of those lost in the disaster.114 These
extra duties all while continuing to manage “all the trivial office work” that was a normal part of
the position.115 Troup wrote back promptly with “surprise” at having received such an
impassioned letter.116 “First of all,” consoled the old Captain, “I wish to say that the Company
appreciates the good work you have done in the North, and the particularly trying time you had
following this recent disaster.”117 Troup understood the tremendous hours that Lowle was putting
in and told his Juneau agent that he was “authorized to get any help that you may need to assist
you … at such rate of pay as you may find it necessary to give.”118 In order to secure Lowle a
“definite holiday,” Troup even suggested a temporary office closure and to have business matters
handled by ships’ pursers “the same as any other way port.”119 After this extraordinary offer
came extraordinary praise. The relatively reserved Troup who allowed compliments in trickles
only told Lowle “I want to assure you that the idea you have formed that your services are not
properly appreciated, is entirely erroneous. The writer has had the highest personal regard for
you.”120 F. F. W. Lowle, stationed in lonely Juneau to represent the expansive Canadian Pacific,
a customer service worker turned emergency manager, was held in greatest esteem by one of the
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most prominent men in BC’s capital. There are times, it seems, that unexpected duties beget
unexpected praise.

Serving the Customer
While Lowle’s efforts surrounding the Princess Sophia disaster were notably intense, the
various crews of the British Columbia Coast Steamship Service consistently worked hard to
serve their customers. Some of their duties included getting raw lumber stowed on a luxurious
passenger vessel without delaying it too severely. Others were responsible for announcing
breakfast via gong. More than a few crewmen exhausted themselves in a cramped kitchen to
produce sumptuous meals. Even those who stayed ashore could not entirely divorce themselves
from the sometimes hard realities of working for a steamship company that operated in
dangerous waters. Whatever their particular niche within the corporate ecosystem of BCCS,
crewmen were rarely alone. Their comradery with each other and long weeks at sea gave rise to
understanding that they could work together in more ways than just those the company paid them
for. While their work of serving the customer would always be work, perhaps it could be made
better through collective action.
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Chapter Three
Working Together
“If the members of your Union are not satisfied with the wages and conditions on our boats they
are not compelled to work for us, and we see no reason why we should be compelled to employ
them.”
– E. H. Beazley

Two strikes—one in 1918, the other a year later—show a full range of industrial
complexities facing the workers and management of the British Columbia Coast Service as they
endeavored to work together. The ships’ Officers refused their duties in 1918 to win managerial
recognition for their union, the Canadian Merchant Service Guild. The Seamen’s strike of 1919
was almost initiated over perennial questions of working conditions and pay, but instead resulted
from the call to a general sympathetic strike supporting workers in Winnipeg. The process of
starting to resolve these issues or recognition, pay, and loyalty was compressed into two short
years.
The decision by companies on whether to recognize the officers’ union or not
precipitated a sea change in management-labor relations throughout all the local steamship lines,
not just BCCS. While steamship line managers—including James Troup and Cyril Neroutsos of
BCCS—could coordinate and share intelligence to control the dynamic at first, they were unable
to maintain their advantages once their employees demonstrated that they could collectively act.
The success of the Masters and Mates’ action catalyzed relationships with other fledgling unions.
Despite managerial dissuasion, workers joined these newly-recognized unions and capital found
that it could no longer even attempt to ignore labor groups. The strike of 1919 illustrates the
increasingly complex dynamics of working together in the Coast Service brought about by union
acceptance. Even though management negotiated in relatively good faith with their employees’
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unions and labor had, in turn, accepted partial defeats on certain issues, the strike went forward
anyway, standing in sympathy with their union brothers in Winnipeg. At stake for all sides were
the intertwined questions of identity and loyalty: were crews company men or union men?
This chapter treats the strikes of 1918 and 1919 not as case studies per se but as
showcases for the many-layered economic and identity questions workers on both sides of the
management/labor divide were grappling with in the late 1910s. Therefore, after dispensing
briefly with the chronology of the two events, treating the summers of 1918 and 1919 as a
blended period of labor unrest allows the issues they raised become the organizational focus.
This blending is possible because of their temporal proximity and connected questions. Union
recognition, pay and working hours, and class/company identity each contributed more
significantly to the narrative of the strikes than the timeline itself. Both strikes also occurred in
the context of Canada’s involvement in, and the immediate aftermath of, the First World War
which reduced the supply of labor and heightened tensions. Even as the Dominion helped fuel
the Empire’s war effort, there were still local economies to be maintained, and shutting down
transportation between Vancouver Island and the mainland was a serious threat that impelled
labor and management to negotiate new understandings for emerging issues.

Walking Out
When the ultimatum finally came down from the assembled Officers of British
Columbia’s local vessels, it gave management only forty-eight hours until the morning of Friday,
August 23, 1918 to recognize the Canadian Merchant Service Guild or face “the biggest tie-up in
the history of coastwise shipping in British Columbia.”1 Management refused, and the Guild
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followed through on its threat to walk out. For BCCS, just one of the steamship lines affected,
services shut down in phases. The first to go were Princess Victoria and Princess Mary, which
completed their service days on the 23rd and then let their boilers grow cold. Princess Charlotte
and Princess Alice darkened their decks on the 24th. Then CPR tugs Nitinat, Nanoose, and
Qualicum all quit in Vancouver and the Strait of Georgia went quiet.2 Hundreds of passengers
found themselves without transportation and literal tons of freight sat idle at dockside
warehouses for want of ships to move them.
Two days later, unwilling to allow the continued separation of British Columbia’s
mainland from its capital, the Prime Minister himself was involved in resolving the strike. “Sir
Robert Borden yesterday took a hand in the shipping difficulties on this coast,” reported the
Vancouver Sun.3 Borden urged the striking officers to return to their ships and promising that the
government would enforce the “assurances from the companies” it had received to recognize the
union.4 Two days of federal pressure and the fleet was moving again, having convinced Troup
and his fellow managers to accept the reality that they must deal with their employees
collectively.5 In return, the Masters and Mates agreed to resume service, ending the strike.6
Just under a year later on June 2nd, 1919, relations with the Masters and Mates having
returned to normalcy, the managers and owners of the local steamship companies went to meet
with a different group workers. Prominent among the former group were J. W. Troup of BCCS
and E. H. Beazley of the Union Steamship Company. The latter were comprised of their
collected wheelsmen, quarterdeckmen, deckhands, paint scrubbers, firemen, oilers, and
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stewards.7 Negotiations were to resume when on the morning of June 3, the crew of Princess
Beatrice landed at the CPR Wharf in Vancouver, secured the vessel, and the skipper signaled
“finished with engines” to the engineers. Then, at eleven o’clock, it was the Officers (along with
the engineers, porters, and cooks) who watched as everyone else walked ashore, not to return.
Back at his office in Victoria, Captain Troup received the news of the strike’s commencement. It
was not unexpected, even despite the meeting the day before and expectation of continued talks,
but in his view, it was entirely unwarranted since they had achieved agreement in principle on
the actual issues of concern to his employees, such as pay and working hours. Troup could not,
however, counter his worker’s growing sense of union identity. Union loyalty towards the
striking workers in Winnipeg and growing working-class polarization during the war years won
out over managerial concessions, and as each successive vessel landed, they too left work,
grinding service to nearly halt for the second time in as many years.8
For just over a week that June, the strike severely disrupted the transportation system, but
did not entirely eliminate it. BCCS continued to operate the minimum necessary to maintain
connection between Victoria and Vancouver. Victoria to Seattle was handled solely by the Puget
Sound Navigation Company (PSNC), owned by Troup’s one-time rival turned good friend
Joshua Green, operating both Sol Duc—which ran the route normally for PSNC, albeit with more
intermediate stops than BCCS patrons were accustomed to—and Indianapolis (as a relief vessel).
The run from Seattle to Vancouver was the only one temporarily abandoned by all companies in
order to focus on more critical links. It was even expected that Princess Adelaide would restore
that final leg of the triangle on June 10th, but service-substitution was determined unnecessary
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before it could be implemented.9 “The continuance of steamship service,” even at a minimum
level, had already “done much to offset the effectiveness of the seamen’s strike” reported the
Victoria Daily Times on the tenth, and the paper’s front-page headline declared that the “strike in
Vancouver has Passed its High-Water Mark.”10 While the high-water mark may have been
reached on the tenth, it took until July 3 for the strike to recede completely, management having
successfully waited their workers out while maintaining services.11 The continuance of coastwise
shipping was necessary for management not only from a tactical perspective in order to
demonstrate to employees that striking could not tie up the fleet, but also to uphold their
obligations.

Steaming Through the Strikes
No obligations were more pressing than those to their regular customers and the Crown
itself. Contracts for the carriage of His Majesty’s mails were indifferent to labor disputes. Letters
were to be delivered on time, as specified, or else risk contracts worth tens of thousands of
dollars.12 Disappointing His Majesty’s postmasters was one thing, frustrating His Majesty’s
subjects was quite another. BCCS ferry service was the most critical link between Vancouver
Island and mainland BC, despite the presence of other companies in the area. For instance, Union
Steamship Company’s vessels were small and focused more on the hard-to-reach nooks and
crannies of the Salish Sea’s fjords.13 Canadian National connected primarily to their own rail
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terminus in Prince Rupert, much farther to the north.14 Even if the Coast Service had been
willing to accept the royal mail penalties, sever the connection between British Columbia’s two
most important population centers, and forego passengers’ fares, they would still be obliged to
uphold the reputation of the mighty Canadian Pacific Railway. BCCS had no real choice: the
ships must go out for King, customer, and company.
The most preferable option during both strikes was simply to run the boats short-staffed,
but this greatly depended on who had walked out. For the 1919 Seamen’s Strike, the company
actually had a relatively easy time of it. “We have been carrying on without them,” wrote Troup
to CPR Vice President D. C. Coleman.15 He continued at length:
The Masters and Mates have given us fair support, not whole-hearted support.
Their Organization [the Canadian Merchant Service Guild] agrees to carry on
their own duties, notwithstanding the labor disturbances, and they undertake to
navigate their ships by doubling up, do the steering, handle the lines, and also
handle the mails, but not any baggage, freight, or express.…
The general office staff … have responded nobly, and handled all the
baggage over the Victoria Wharf since the strike started.…
… [The Engineers] have hesitated a little about going on some of the
routes that could hardly be considered as vital, but they have done very well, and I
have kept in close personal touch with them. The Engineers doubled up on the
boats, and took care of the fires.…
… The Chief Stewards and Second Stewards have proven most loyal, and
have worked very hard indeed, in carrying on their departments.…
The Chinese Cooks and Porters have also staid [sic] to a man,
notwithstanding efforts made to get them off, so that taken as a whole, we have
not done too badly.16
By using the groups of employees who stayed aboard, cross-strait services could be maintained.
The one area of service that was degraded during the strike were meals. While the galleys
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remained fully crewed and ready to serve their guests, the Chief and Second Stewards could not
wait on the entire dining room themselves without their subordinates. While afternoon tea and
light refreshments could still be provided, BCCS had a reputation to uphold.17 This led the
company to seek replacements.
In 1918, Troup had predicted that a future strike would require replacement workers and
he formulated a novel solution: replace striking men with women.18 He followed through on this
plan when the opportunity to test it arose during the strike of 1919. “C.P.R. Will Use Women In
Stewards Department to Replace the Strikers,” read the Victoria Daily Times headline on June 4.
The article emphasized that the ladies would be “Properly Chaperoned and Neatly Uniformed”
and Troup assured the public that they would be supervised by an experienced stewardess at all
times who would help them “soon find their sea legs.”19 Women in 1910s and 1920s British
Columbia were still severely limited in career fields, should they choose to seek paid
employment, typically pursuing the “respectable” jobs of teaching, nursing, or typing.20 It is
unsurprising then that young women job-seekers responded enthusiastically to the new
opportunity, and barely two days later “the innovation” of having stewardesses instead of
stewards was already “proving a complete success.”21 In truth, Troup’s action was more of an
expansion than an innovation as women had previously served aboard BCCS vessels in a limited
capacity, which is why “experienced” stewardesses existed. Nonetheless, this was the first time
that women were employed by the company in great numbers as evidenced by crew rosters, and
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the first time they were used to break a strike.22 Another group traditionally marginalized from
the labor force was also recruited to meet the company’s need. Troup reported satisfaction that
he had “succeeded in getting Indian [i.e., Indigenous] deckhands” for two of their vessels.23
Replacements were also found indirectly by hiring already fully-crewed outside boats.
The simplest of these arrangements was the maintenance of railcar barge service, accomplished
by hiring an extra tug or two when they were available.24 For other services, BCCS turned to its
competitors for help, most notably, PSNC. “We would have been unable to carry on to Seattle
but for the Puget Sound Navigation Company,” Troup wrote, adding that because of PSNC help
“we have not lost a mail run to or from Seattle.”25 PSNC had come to the rescue of BCCS in
1918 as well, adjusting the sailings of the Indianapolis on the Victoria-Seattle run to allow for
connection with CPR service. The Indianapolis and its crew could only do so much, however,
and was unable to complete the other legs of the triangle. Troup, ever the problem-solver, took
stock of his fleet and noticed that the boats were still there, the Deckhands, Stewards, and
Engineers all remained aboard, and all that was missing were Officers. Fortunately, he knew two
very able mariners already in the company’s employ who had not gone on strike and dispatched
them immediately. Captains Troup and Neroutsos walked aboard Princess Patricia and put
themselves back, literally, at the helm for the first time in years.
“We succeeded in furnishing a service today,” chuffed Captain Troup on August 24,
1918, “from Victoria to Vancouver with the ‘Princess Patricia’ handled by Captain Neroutsos
and myself.”26 While he lamented that there would be no service to Nanaimo for the time being,
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the freshly-returned-to-the-pilot-house old skipper seemed in high spirits.27 Contributing to his
good humor was the Ministry of Labour’s instruction to the striking officers to return to work
until the Royal Commission, authorized under the 1907 Industrial Disputes Investigation Act,
had made its findings (even if the instruction had not yet been heeded), and the news that
Princess Adelaide would complete one last night service before tying up.28 Troup was also glad
to find that despite reports that the engineers would refuse to go out under the command of a
non-guild member, the Engineers had agreed to “remain neutral and carry on with Capt.
Neroutsos or myself.”29 In total, while Troup asserted “the Princess Patricia is handling
passengers, mail, and baggage, between Victoria and Vancouver very satisfactorily,” there was
clear relief when the strike ended and BCCS could resume normal service.30 While the Coast
Service found it could afford to put its Manager and Marine Superintendent on a boat for short
periods during a strike, it was also clear that, ultimately, they could not refuse to treat with
organized labor any longer, despite their campaign to the contrary.

(Not) Recognizing the Unions
Over the course of the two strikes, steamship company managers realized two guiding
truths when dealing with their employees’ unions. Firstly, decisions are made by the people at
the table; by controlling who is sitting at the table, one can influence the decision before
negotiations even start. Second, the strength of the union is its collective cohesion. Thus,
companies would need to divide the unions to control them. From these points, management of
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all four coastwise steamer companies—BCCS, Union Steamships, Canadian National Railway
(CNR), and Puget Sound Navigation Company (PSNC)—launched a coordinated effort to deny
recognition and power to their employees’ collective bargaining units. The reason for such
coordination was simple: while labor trouble could start in any of the steamer lines, it would
quickly expand to all of them.31 Province-wide, the labor movement was being received with
hostility from the professional classes, from as high as the Legislative Assembly refusing to
extend the right of public assembly to Company Towns all the way to small measures such as
town postmasters destroying pro-labor newsletters.32 Despite the companies’ collecting and
sharing intelligence on the unions, their cardinal strategy for combating organized labor was to
insist that each company’s business was its own business.
In their correspondence with the Canadian Merchant Service Guild, managers repeatedly
retreated to the argument that their employees could talk to them directly and that union
supervision was both unneeded and impertinent. “Our Engineers had no difficulty in making an
arrangement for dealing with their own Company,” Troup wrote to the Guild in response to their
insistence that members of the union’s executive be present at negotiations, even though “they
were members of an organization similar to yours, and I feel quite sure that we will be able to
maintain just as pleasant relations with our Masters and Deck Officers.”33 Union Steamships’
Beazley, ever the proverbial “bad cop” to Troup’s more polite presentation, made halfintimidating observations about the same, noting “that action of this sort tends more to disrupt
the pleasant relations which have hitherto existed between this Company and its employees,
rather than improve wages or working conditions”34 Company officials had a double purpose in
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trying to keep their negotiations away from the direct influence of union leaders. First, in the
same way as collective action gains its strength from large numbers of united workers, keeping
bargaining groups small made them more manageable by management. More insidiously,
however, managers could use their personal relationships with, and knowledge of, their
employees to their advantage.
Personal politics were a potent tool in the steamship industry. While the province had
achieved twelve percent union membership by 1911, half a decade before the coastal labor
troubles, most of these gains had been in “depersonalized” resource-extracting industries.35
Playing off of this, it was their industry’s continued personal nature that shipping executives
emphasized, citing the “pleasant relations” they had previously enjoyed.36 “I have only to
repeat,” Beazley wrote, “that if any of our officers are not satisfied with the wages to which we
have recently advanced them, they can come and discuss the matter with me personally, but” he
critically added, “I distinctly decline to discuss the matter with outside persons.”37 Troup
expanded on management’s position of refusing to deal with union executives. Writing back to
the Merchant Service Guild after “accepting” a meeting between executives, BCCS guild
members, and BCCS management at the Guild office in Vancouver, Troup corrected the record:
Evidently you misunderstood my letter of May 6th. It was our intention to convey
the idea that we were prepared to meet a committee of men employed by this
Company. A large number of employees have earned their livelihood under me, in
the Canadian Pacific Service, for from five to seventeen years, and it would
appear to be unnecessary that outsiders should serve on a committee for the
purpose of discussing betterments in their wage scale; and furthermore, the proper
place for such a meeting is in this office[, in Victoria].38
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Troup’s explanation reveals more about management’s strategic intent than he likely anticipated,
however. While his demand to exclude anyone not employed by the company may seem like a
reasonable enough request on its face, he goes on to reveal that part of his rationale for meeting
exclusively with his own employees is that the officers in question have served with him for a
half-decade or more. Troup knows these men intimately. Officers, especially ships’ Masters,
were in very close liaison with the manager; after all, they were the face of the company to the
public and responsible for vessels representing tremendous investment, so management had to
trust them completely.39 Troup also subtly reminds the union that they are not simply dealing
with a ferry service on a single coast in a single province—they are facing the entire weight of
the Canadian Pacific Railway Company. Finally, he closes with a symbolic show of authority,
demanding that workers must come to him, not the other way around.
There were also outright efforts by management to dissuade workers from uniting. Troup
made visits to various departments along with certain trusted senior employees such as Mr.
Rowlands, the Port Steward, to enhance the trust between labor and management by showing
face and being personable.40 Neroutsos wrote to disgruntled Third Officers that their new pay
scale “would in all probability have been in effect now if had not been for the mischievous
interference of the officers of the Canadian Merchant Service Guild,” attempting to blame union
executives for the delay and imply that it was company management that really had workers’
best interests at heart.41 At the same time as managers tried to schmooze their employees, they
also retaliated against labor organizers. One of these attacks was aimed at the Merchant Service
Guild President, Captain Batchelor, who was a pilot under the auspices of the Vancouver
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Pilotage Commission. Technically, this made him a public employee. The chief of Union
Steamships, E. H. Beazley, wrote to the Commission demanding that Batchelor’s activities be
“curbed” due to the perceived conflict of interest.42 The Commission evidently declined to do so
as Batchelor remained President of the local and led the Masters and Mates to strike a month
later.
Despite the words placed in their ears by management and the threats made against union
leaders, employees were not to be dissuaded. Workers did join unions, and those who joined up
wanted to get results. In the face of management that constantly wanted to separate them, the
Merchant Service Guild’s membership were reported to be 99% in favor of being represented by
their executives.43 Guild President Batchelor wrote that management’s “refusal to open a
discussion” with union leaders “would leave us no alternative” than to picket.44 With such a
strong mandate of support and a clear statement of consequences bolstering labor’s position,
Guild Secretary Goodlad informed the steamship companies that “it will be a very great mistake
on the part of the Owners” to continue to stonewall the union.45 Goodlad’s confidence was likely
bolstered by conciliatory sentiments developing in maritime unionism.
The wartime demand for seamen had demonstrated that cooperation between capital and
labor was more advantageous than their competition. This call to cooperation is on display in a
full page advertisement showing a suited and cuff-linked man with immaculate hair and a
mustache alongside a clean-shaven worker wearing overalls and an apron (but otherwise
shirtless) both pulling a wagon in which is a globe bearing the words “world’s trade.” “This is
not a one-man job,” reads the ad’s copy, “neither capital nor labor, acting without the help of the
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other, can pull this load. Together they do it with ease … Cooperation is the big thing needed
now.”46 This propagandic depiction of working together, while still decidedly pro-capitalism,
was echoed by government action. Canada was still profoundly tied to the Imperial Government
in London, and so Britain’s establishment of a National Maritime Board to oversee a “centralized
… industry-wide union shop” was surely of great concern to BC steamship line officials.47
Perhaps noting these sea-changes, Troup realized he had mis-timed his responses if he wanted to
beat the average outcome. While he was not opposed to suffering a strike—he was confident that
the public would take management’s side in the dispute—Troup lamented that “if we were going
to have a strike of any kind we should, of course, have brought it about right in the very start.”48
Now that the company had “shown a disposition to meet” with their unionized employees
however, he privately recommended to headquarters that BCCS “should enter into this
arrangement for the coming year at least.”49
Even when management did work with the unions, results were frequently disappointing
from the company’s perspective. Unions, it seemed to BCCS leadership, were very good at
disrupting the normal flow of operations but rather poor at recruiting and maintaining a stable
body of skilled workers for the companies to draw from. A frustrated Captain Troup vented
about this to his superiors in Winnipeg, stating that the Seamen’s Union “has not in any way
secured us men, and in fact … we have never had so much difficulty in getting them as we are
having at the present time.”50 Whether this was truly a failing of the Union or more a symptom
of the ongoing war in Europe was left unasked by BCCS’ Manager.
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In reality, the BC labor market during World War I was dismal for industries requiring
young men. British Columbians, influenced both by the province’s “uneven sex ratio” and
residual “British character” as argued by historian Jean Barman, joined wholeheartedly with
former Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier’s declaration that “when the call comes our answer goes
at once…: ‘Ready, aye, ready.’”51 With fully nine percent of the province’s population
answering “ready” and deploying away from the local economy, BCCS was in some ways lucky
to escape the fate of the closely related sternwheeler services plying BC’s rivers and lakes which
effectively crumbled during the war.52 Nonetheless, Troup’s labor pool was severely diminished
even as soldiers began returning home, regardless of union cooperation.
Cooperation was not guaranteed, however, and the greatest irritant for BCCS
management in working with organized labor was capriciousness. Prior to the strike in 1919,
management conceded rather more than they wanted “as a last effort to prevent” a tie up and
secured agreement in principle from the Union.53 After the Seamen went back on their tentative
agreement by heeding the call to a sympathetic strike, an indignant Troup considered all bets to
be off. “These men,” he wrote, “without any grievance whatever, went out on a sympathetic
strike, put the Steamship Companies to untold expense, and they should now go back to work
under the old conditions or not at all.”54 Ultimately, this was merely bluster from the Manager.
He recognized that the negotiating process could not be wholly undone now that it had been
started, and after resolving the immediate labor tensions, began to renew relationships with his
employees.
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After the conclusion of the 1918 and 1919 strikes—and the World War—labor began to
normalize. Management accepted the fate of collective bargaining and unions began to become
more flexible in their dealings with the companies. By as early as October 1919, Troup noted a
return to some of the “pleasant relations” management had formerly enjoyed: he met with a
group of officers composed solely of BCCS employees and entirely without Merchant Service
Guild leaders present, one of his original, unfulfilled, demands.55 Two years later, Troup was
even taking the initiative to reach out. He telegrammed Goodlad of the Officers’ union asking
that the union leaders draw up a committee in preparation to discuss the details of an upcoming
pay cut that higher headquarters in Winnipeg had decided to implement.56 While notable, and
perhaps even commendable, that the tenured old manager was finally working with organized
labor, unions were decidedly unenthusiastic about wage reductions. Normally, they negotiated
for quite the opposite.

More Pay for Less Work
Before ultimately walking out in sympathy with Winnipegger workers, the Seamen’s
Union was negotiating hard for concessions that steamship owners were unwilling to make.
Chief among their demands was more pay for less work. Specifically, the Union was asking for
the institution of an eight-hour day and a general pay raise from $65.00 to $75.00 per month.57
While management viewed the pay request was merely noisome, they perceived the eight-hour
day as flatly untenable.
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Agitation for a three-watch system and the eight-hour workday it provided had been
going on for several years. It seems that the quartermasters were the first to request it, as an
aghast Troup wrote to Winnipeg reporting that they had asked for “three” watches, but that he
and Neroutsos has “managed to stave that off.”58 Members of the Seamen’s Union, as noted,
requested it by June of the next year. Just months after the 1919 strike concluded, the officers
added their voice to the chorus, and Troup finally decided to take it under consideration.59 The
officers did not stop there, as they also asked for one day off a week and holidays.60 BCCS
management could stomach giving their officers a day off each week, but granting holidays too
was “nonsense, and… would simply amount to graft.”61 Competing coastwise line Union
Steamships took an even harder line when the same request was made to them, responding that
“four days shore leave every twenty-eight days is quite impossible on our vessels as a rule.”62
Within a decade of the strikes, though, weekly time off was a settled question. By 1926, the only
group left without a guaranteed day off were the Stewards.63
Pay increases were viewed more reasonably by management that requests for time off.
The ten dollar per month pay raise desired was, in fact, entirely in line with other requests from
the past two years. The seamen had demanded the very same increase in 1918 and been partially
successful, securing the higher rate for the most senior among them.64 Carpenters and joiners
had also asked the company in 1918 to level the $1.80 per day difference between working for
BCCS directly and working for local shipyards.65 Troup allowed an increase for only the amount
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after the decimal point.66 Unions tended to favor these kinds of flat-rate increases. When the
officers requested a $25 flat increase instead of a 25% increase, they explained that “the low man
needed a larger proportion of help than the better paid man,” and raising pay by a fixed amount
helped to accomplish this.67 Troup was torn on questions on pay raises in the late 1910s because
on the one hand, he thought it was hard to “see what justification there is … [when] the cost of
living is coming down and so are the earnings of our boats,” but on the other he recognized that
“you almost wonder why we get any men at all” when there was better money to be made
elsewhere.68 It is unclear why Troup believed that the cost of living was decreasing; historians
have found an increase of from eight to eighteen percent over the course of the war.69
Nonetheless, perception is reality, and conflicted though he was, Troup ended up bowing to
market pressures in a tight labor market and sought pay increases for his employees on a number
of occasions.
Troup and Neroutsos were particularly sensitive to pay differentials between different
classes of employees within the service and between BCCS and its labor-force competitors. The
social hierarchy aboard ship was maintained in part by pay rates. When Quartermasters’ pay
eclipsed that of Third Officers, a situation unacceptable to the Officers given their higher status,
Neroutsos was obliged to publish a circular letter to them acknowledging that management was
aware of the issue and working on a solution. The same day as the circular went out, Troup wrote
to CPR Vice President Grant Hall via his assistant C. E. Stockdill in Winnipeg asking for
permission to give the increases.70 Approval was quick in coming: a scrawled endorsement from
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Stockdill on the back of Troup’s letter was all the boss needed. Four letters—“OK GH”—gave
the officers their raise.71 Learning from this experience, Troup and Neroutsos moved cautiously
when increasing compensation for other groups with lower social status aboard. Management
turned to bonuses not only as a way to “head off a monthly increase in wages,” but also to
concede increased pay without it appearing as though they were doing so, maintaining their own
strategic interests in future negotiations with their employees.72 While pay differentials internal
to BCCS could cause labor unrest, differentials with competitors could cause labor shortage. As
noted previously, company management authorized a pay increase for Carpenters and Joiners to
prevent them leaving for shipyards, a very real threat as the shipbuilding industry in the Pacific
Northwest increased due to plentiful, local resources, government subsidies, and wartime
demand for new naval facilities.73 Management could also use the inverse: a negative pay
differential to screened out unreliable and temperamental white cooks (who generally preferred
to be working ashore at logging camps) in favor of crews made up by dedicated and highly
skilled Chinese immigrants.74

Chinese Organization
In other industries, Chinese and Japanese workers were routinely brought in as strikebreakers, but BCCS already had a dedicated corps of Chinese workers aboard.75 Indeed, Chinese
cooks were the one group among all those who worked for the Princess Fleet never went out on
strike. They were considered completely loyal, dependable, and highly trained. While Captain
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Troup made a point praising Chinese crewmembers to higher headquarters, and Captain
Neroutsos would do the same once he took over as Manager. Though praised for their
forbearance by successive Managers, the Chinese galley staff members were nonetheless savvy
to the power of collective bargaining and their position aboard. Like every other department
aboard, they requested periodic increases in pay, undertook union activities, and struck a delicate
balance between advancing their own interests and keeping the Company happy.
Chief among the factors the Company saw as beneficial to retaining their Chinese cooks
was the extent to which they could control them. Chinese immigrants to Canada at the turn of the
century had few options for good employment, but the ferry service was one of the few.
Management was fully aware that working for BCCS was stable and offered a reasonably
competitive rate of pay, unlike other opportunities available to this group. Additionally, keeping
their Chinese employees confined to the galley for long hours limited their ability to interact and
organize with other departments. Cowed by the experience of Seamen’s Union sympathetic
strike, Troup remarked that “if we can control the Chinese and keep them out of the Stewards’
Union, we have the control then in our hands absolutely.”76 The key to maintaining this control
was each boat’s Chief Cook. “[The Chief Cook] is more or less responsible for and holds his
crew,” remarked Troup. In 1919, the Company learned that “the Chief Cooks are the controlling
factor” for keeping the galley in order, so much so that management took the position that “if he
is perfectly satisfied, [the rest of the galley crew] will be contented as well.”77 A bonus program
was instituted to maintain the perfect satisfaction of the cooks. While the method of
distribution—providing a single check to the Chief Cook—allowed the possibility of the Chief
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taking “perhaps the lion’s share” of a bonus payment meant to be distributed to the entire kitchen
staff, it also only cost $200 per ship per year.78 Compared to the $5.00 to $10.00 per month
increases that white stewards got the same month, these bonuses paid out to the Chief Cook were
a bargain.79
Bonus payments in lieu of official wage increases were typical of all the coastwise
steamship operators in British Columbia, not merely BCCS. Nor was BCCS the first to
implement it. For instance, when seeking reauthorization for the scheme, Troup pointed to the
example of Canadian National (also called the Grand Trunk) which used the same model.80
Troup and Neroutsos repeatedly warned their superiors that “it is extremely undesirable that
[bonuses] should show on the payroll” lest the Stewards get ideas of their own about increased
pay.81 This indicates that not only did management believe the cooks would keep silent about
their pay bump, but that they were socially insulated enough from the rest of the ship’s crew that
silence was plausible. Management was not just concerned about putting an idea of bonuses in
the heads of their employees, they were concerned also about retaliation for paying Chinese
workers more than whites.
In the aftermath of the 1919 strike, Troup and Neroutsos had “intended to recommend [a
pay increase to] $100.00 per month for the Chief Cooks on the larger boats” as a reward for
outstanding performance by keeping their galleys in order. Instead, the BCCS top two decided to
intentionally keep their pay below the level of the most junior officer.82 Chinese immigrants
were frequently excluded from respectable work altogether in British Columbia, so the use of
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pay rates to reinforce the province’s social hierarchy aboard BCCS vessels was not unexpected.83
Their choice to pay Chinese Chief Cooks less than what both Troup and Neroutsos agreed they
deserved stands in strange contrast to Troup’s assertion later in the same letter that the Company
is “morally bound to do something for” the galley crews.84
The company’s moral obligation to support their Chinese employees better in the face of
racialized social constraints continued to grow. By 1924 the cooks had organized beyond their
individual galleys affiliated the Chinese Seamen’s Institute and requested a “revision upwards”
in their pay.85 In line with the demands of White unions, the cooks argued a pay raise was
deserved due to the longevity of their service to the Company—ten or fifteen years in some
cases.86 Demonstrating the business savvy, however, they also advised the company that Chief
Cooks were “finding it increasingly difficult to obtain qualified assistance” because of the
“generally too low” pay rates together with “registration regulations.”87 By noting an external
factor that made coastwise service more onerous in general for Chinese-Canadians—the
registration requirements—they created pressure on the company to affect increase since it was
the factor the Company could actually control. In 1926, Neroutsos, acting on behalf of BCCS
management, endorsed a pay raise in a letter back to Winnipeg. Cooks on the large vessels
Princess Kathleen and Princess Marguerite were authorized raises of between $10.00 to $15.00
per month. Ominously, and accurately, Neroutsos added in the letter, “I am not satisfied this will
be the end of it.”88
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By 1933, Chinese galley crewmen had achieved near-equality in pay with similarly
qualified whites, a feat that would have been unthinkable a few decades earlier.89 A crew of
seven Chinese Canadians earned $394.35 while a White crew of the same size would get
$399.07.90 This parity in absolute pay, however, was misleading. Nearly a decade of organizing
had not relieved the cooks of the burden of providing and keeping up their own uniforms or
kitchen tools, costing the employees at least $5,990.00 annually for the tools alone.91 Nor had it
won them shorter hours, rather, the sixty-four Chinese employees across the fleet would require
one hundred and nineteen whites to replace them because white crews would refuse to work the
same length of shift or cross-train on multiple positions in the galley.92 By the Company’s own
estimate, it would cost an extra $69,119.88 per year to employ exclusively White cooks.93 More
importantly to the disruption-averse BCCS, “white galley crews are prone to intemperance
whereas Chinese crews are thoroughly reliable.”94 This combination of reliability and
exploitability made for a winning proposition in the eyes of management. Chinese cooks
tolerated it, it would seem, because reliability to the company translated to stability of
employment for themselves.
Ultimately, the Company viewed their Chinese employees as integral to the fleet. “From
my long experience with the B. C. Coast Service,” wrote Captain Neroutsos almost five years
after taking over as manager, “I am satisfied that if the right of the Company to employ Oriental
labour in the kitchens on these boats is restricted, the Company will be seriously embarrassed in
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its operations.”95 Not hindered, not disadvantaged, not less profitable, but “embarrassed.” Welltrained, loyal crewmen who were responsible for a key feature of BCCS customer service and
accepted the Company’s terms with little dissent were ideal employees.96 They were “Company
men.”

Company Men
What it meant to be a “Company man” was being defined for the BC Coast Service in the
Troup Era. Undoubtedly, tenure with the company was a key component, as was ability, but in
order to receive the appellation, fidelity to management was the defining factor. This explicitly
barred union organizers and those who were taken in by them. Management recognized, of
course, that there were more shades to their employees’ loyalty than “Company man” and
“trouble” but took action to conspicuously reward the former category to show what behavior
was desired.
BCCS management praised staff who refused to strike with the rest of the men. In some
cases, such as with the cooks, this praise was given to entire departments. The wharf-side
Baggage Department responded loyally, too, giving “practically all [the help] we could ask.”97
The Engineers were particularly commended, for despite being “pressed very hard by the
organizations round about” they continued to undertake their duties citing the public necessity
that ferry service represented.98 In each of these cases, Troup cited the most tenured among the
departments as the deciding factor. For the engineers, it was “the senior men among them [who]
held them in line;” with the cooks, it was each boat’s Chief Cook; the baggage handlers were led
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to work by their own head-of-department, one Mr. Mulliner.99 Individual union defectors were
also recognized, such as Mr. McLeod, the foreman of the wharf-side freight checkers, who
defied the rest of his crew and “worked right through [the strike] along with the office staff” to
ensure goods were loaded onto the ships for service across the gulf.100
Refusing organization altogether was an even higher order of loyalty to the company.
“The Stewards’ Union did their very best to get the Second Stewards into their organization,”
reported Captain Troup shortly after the 1919 Strike ended. Their loyalty was maintained intact,
however, “by the efforts of Mr. Rowlands, the Port Steward” and the manager himself.101 For
this Troup called them, in as many words, “Company men.”102 By contrast, workers who chose
to organize and defy management were cast out of the glow of Troup’s praise. The old captain
bitterly remarked that “the freight office staff, headed by … the Local Wharf Agent, did not
respond in any way [to the request to keep working during the sympathetic strikes], and are
evidently organized, and not any longer loyal Company men.”103 The simplicity of this binary
which equated unorganized to good and organized to bad can give a false impression that
Captain Troup lacked nuance in appraising his employees. While it is certainly the case that
Troup saw company loyalty as mutually exclusive with union activities, he also recognized that a
significant portion of his workforce was young, inexperienced, and not fully culpable when
disloyalty was inspired by their elders. He described them as “mere boys … not old enough to
understand anything but that they had to leave the boats when they were told to” by union
leaders.104 Nonetheless, while he absolves them in part of wrongdoing in the eyes of CPR, his
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disappointment can be felt through his choice of language. “Mere boys” were certainly not
“Company men.”

Pensions, the “Gift of the Company”
Rewarding long-serving employees and loyal “Company men” was accomplished by
CPR’s pension scheme. For workers preparing to end their strikes and return to the boats, the
question of what would happen to their pensions was forefront in their minds. “The crux of the
whole case is now coming just as I expected,” wrote Troup on the last day of the Masters and
Mates’ Strike in 1918.105 Having been informed that their previously-earned pensions would not
be honored, the officers were “holding out” for their restoration before agreeing to formally end
the walk out.106 “We can agree re [sic] no discrimination,” in reassigning the striking employees
to their posts, CPR Vice President Grant Hall cabled back to Troup, “but it has been understood
pension privileges [would be] cancelled” in all cases, even when the company had “sometimes
allowed [other past privileges] when employees have returned after strike.”107 The pension was,
Hall stated, a “gift of the company which can be withdrawn at any time.”108
Management, both in Victoria and Winnipeg, agreed that the line must be held, and an
example made of those who joined the strike. “On this point we cannot give way,” came Hall’s
fiat, and pensions were cancelled.109 Troup readily agreed, answering that “if the Company
should, in this settlement” currently being negotiated with the Merchant Service Guild, “waive
the cancelling of pensions for the men who went on strike” then the departments that stayed out
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of fear of repercussion “will give us the ‘horse laugh’ and the dignity of the Company, and
control, will be lost.”110 This reveals that it was not out of a sense of action-and-consequence or
even financial considerations that the pensions were cancelled, but ultimately that it was method
of control, pure and simple. Management’s need to punish the disloyal and maintain control
through fear created a lingering resentment that festered into a perennial problem.
The officers kept requesting the restoration of their pensions. They felt it was not a “gift”
but an earned part of their total compensation and threatened to press their case. Troup told them
in no uncertain terms when they continued to agitate for a resolution half a year after their strike
that CPR was “not prepared to agree to any compromise on the pension question,” a question
which he had already been advised by Hall was “not subject to arbitration.”111 “The Company
would never consent to the abandonment of their pension rules,” he continued, and “would throw
over the whole pension system first.”112 Almost a year later still, Troup repeated the company’s
position nearly verbatim to how it had been expressed before:
I informed [Captain Slater] that there could be no deviation from the Company’s
rule; that he and the others had been warned before the strike, of what the result
would be, and that my instructions from the Company were, in effect, that there
would be absolutely no deviation from the rule in this case, and that it was useless
to discuss the matter. That the Company would abolish the whole pension system
before they would make an exception in favor of the B.C. Coast Service.113
The example made of the Officers was only useful as long as it was followed through on.
Regardless of the fact that the group being punished was the highest-ranking aboard the ships in
the Coast Service, perhaps even because of it, the Company needed to demonstrate to all its
employees that striking would have life-long economic consequences.
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By 1945, Troup, Neroutsos, Hall, Coleman, and all the other senior managers in CPR
who had made the decision to hold fast to their pension plan’s rules had long since retired or
even passed away. The pension question, however, was not yet dead itself. O. J. Williams, the
new manager of BCCS, received an inquiry one morning from the federal Department of Labor
requesting his “viewpoint on the whole matter” before a Royal Commission be appointed to
investigate.114 The Merchant Service Guild had apparently appealed all the way to Prime
Minister Mackenzie King to get the retirement money they felt they were owed.115 Political
wrangling persisted for the next several years until finally, in 1949, the House of Commons
voted 38-105 against appointing the commission.116 There was no longer a strike to break. There
was no more control to maintain. CPR had even instituted an entirely new pension system by
mid-century.117 Nonetheless, the company stood by its decision to impose a lingering punishment
on its former employees who had chosen to work collectively, and the pensions were not
reinstated.

Working Together
Nearing the end of Troup’s tenure as Manager, Neroutsos (now promoted officially to
Assistant Manager) remarked to the Captain that “it would appear that we are now on the eve of
a general application for a revision, not only in wages, but in the working scale on our B.C.
Coast Steamers.”118 Troup could have easily added that it was the nature of work altogether that
was changing. James Troup had the dubious honor of presiding over an era of rapid change in
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industrial relations for the BC Coast Service. None of these years were more challenging than
1918 and 1919. Troup, Neroutsos, Batchelor, Stockdill, their constituents, and their superiors
were all called upon to negotiate how they would work together, and the strikes of these two
years reveal many of their answers.
Labor and management first established to each other that they were both powerful and
not to be ignored. Managers discovered they could no longer rely upon leveraging their intimate
knowledge of their employees to resolve disputes. Nor could labor expect their employers to
concede every issue, no matter how much pressure was applied to them, and certain issues
simply would not budge. Both sides accepted that there would always be inequities in wages.
Different groups of workers tried to get ahead of the others at different times, other groups (and
individuals) attempted to impress with their loyalty to win company favor, and management
orchestrated their various pay increases carefully to maintain a delicate balance of socioeconomic power. Working together in BCCS was, at times, a difficult task. Nonetheless, the
employees of CPR’s coastwise marine branch managed to do so, for stretches of time at least.
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Conclusion
All The Princesses’ Men

The Princesses of Canadian Pacific Railway’s British Columbia Coast Steamship Service
(BCCS) commanded Captains, Officers, Engineers, Firemen, Oilers, Coal Passers, Able Bodies,
Quartermasters, Lookouts, Watchmen, Managers, Superintendents, Freight Handlers, Pursers,
Stewards, Cooks, and Shore Agents. Although their duties were numerous, their unions various,
and work undoubtedly laborious, the employees of BCCS nevertheless managed to serve the
people of British Columbia together. Navigating ships along and across the Strait of Georgia and
its connecting waters required hundreds of worker hours to complete safely; doing so while
passengers enjoyed the journey in luxury required hundreds more.
Nevertheless, the general tenor of the crew’s attitude is found nowhere better than in the
jokes they recorded for each other. Composed for what one assumes must have been an evening
of staff follies, five stewardesses of the Princess Alice created a satirical Last Will and Testament
bequeathing a number of nonsense items to their crewmates:
First
Unto our beloved Captain S. H. Ormiston, we will, give, devise and
bequeath the privilege of playing the Victrola.
Second
Unto our highly esteemed friend First Officer Mr. Palmer, we will, give
devise and bequeath the privilege of challenging all newcomers for the
championship of the shuffleboard.
Third
Unto our friend Second Officer Mr. Hughes, we will, give, devise and
bequeath the privilege of seeing that all children between the ages of sixteen and
sixty are in their staterooms by midnight.
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Fourth
Unto our witty and entertaining friend Third Officer Mr. McGraw we will,
give, devise and bequeath the title of “Heartbreaker” because of his winning
ways, divine dancing and general good line.
Fifth
Unto Purser Mr. McDonald, we will, give, devise and bequeath the
privilege of being in charge of the foolish-question bureau and of finding and
returning all lost gum, toothpicks and hairpins.
Sixth
Unto Mr. T. Brown, our worthy Chief Steward, we will, give, devise and
bequeath the responsibility of emptying all buckets of steam daily.
Seventh
Unto our handsome Romeo of the Wireless, Mr. Sparks, we will, give,
devise and bequeath the privilege of blowing out all lights nightly.
Eighth
Unto the Crew in general, we will, give, devise and bequeath the privilege
of ironing out the waves, dusting the clouds and changing the scenery.
Ninth
Unto the Passengers in general, we will, give, devise and bequeath the
privilege of forgetting all responsibilities, feeding the fish and putting on the dog
at all times.
Lastly
Having full confidence in the honesty and full integrity of the ship’s cat,
we hereby nominate and appoint the said ship’s cat as executor of this our last
will and testament with full power to act under the provisions of this will.1
The Will was witnessed by “Amos Quito” and “Ella Vator,” whose names should be said out
loud for full effect.2 The entire story of working for BCCS is in this document. Five women, only
employed in any kind of numbers as a result of the strike of 1919, were socially established
enough within the crew to poke fun not only at their superiors, but at the passengers too. The
Officers are given gentile bequests—playing the victrola (a type of phonograph) and

Mary Lotto, Eunice Kane, Signe Engstrand, Ida Anderson, and Eve Anderson, “Last Will and Testament,” June 17,
1923, folder 4, box 7, EMC.
2
Mary Lotto et al., “Last Will and Testament,” June 17, 1923, folder 4, box 7, EMC.
1
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commanding the shuffleboard—that also acknowledge their social responsibilities within the
crew. Their direct supervisors, the Chief Steward and Purser, are given pointless and impossible
tasks that nevertheless touch on their areas of responsibility. The “Crew in general” was asked to
provide a magical and fairy tale-esque experience for the passengers—who in turn were mocked
for seasickness even while attempting to act glamorously. The women even comment on the
good looks of two of the men aboard (“general good line,” as in the “lines,” or contours, of the
ship, and “handsome Romeo of the wireless”). This was a group that felt comfortable around
each other, knew each other well, and developed their own shipboard work culture. Notably
absent, however, are the engine room staff and the cooks.
Engineers and Cooks had their own, independent companionship within their own
groups. Both of these crews within the crew were physically segregated from the rest of the
ship’s operations—the Cooks in the galley, the Engineers in the engine room. They were further
divided by race and culture on the part of the Cooks or technical knowledge and grime on the
part of the engine room staff. Even insulated as they were, both groups were still parts of the
fuller crew. The engine room staff printed New Year’s cards to give out, complete with poetry by
Kipling celebrating the machines they operated: “… sing the Song o Steam … True beat, full
power, the clanging chorus goes / Clear to the tunnel where they sit, the purring, Dynamoes.”3
When a head cook retired, the entire Steward’s Department and even the Captain crossed racial
lines to attend the party and celebrate his service to the customers, the crew, and the company.4
At its core, the British Columbia Coast Steamship Service was, as its name foreshadows,
a part of the service industry. Working for it, therefore, was in many ways like any other service

Princess Victoria Engine-room Staff, “New Years Greeting” card, n.d., folder 14, box 6, EMC. The poem quoted
on the card is an imperfectly-transcribed selection from Rudyard Kipling’s “McAndrew’s Hymn.”
4
“Retirement [of] Chief Cook Choy Gaow,” photograph, n.d., folder 2, box 7, EMC.
3
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industry job. There were customers to be waited upon, facilities to be maintained, and
appearances to be upkept. The same delineations between “back of house” and “front of house”
were present on BCCS vessels just as they were at shoreside restaurants and hotels. Those
producing the service being consumed—such as cooks in a restaurant, housekeeping in a hotel,
or firemen on a steamer—were hidden away from public view allowing the clean and polished
“front of house” staff to deliver those services while keeping a veneer of effortless glamor over
the operations. Just as with any other service industry, the activities of labor organizations ebbed
and flowed, at times boiling over in a strike action, often simply something to be worked
through. Like many other service jobs, the stories of the crews have been largely untold.
The employees of BCCS were responsible for providing a reliable, safe, and critical
transportation link between the growing population and industrial centers of British Columbia.
Canneries were appearing to process rich harvests of salmon and lumber camps operated at full
capacity, requiring ways to move workers in and goods out. BC experienced an influx of
migrants from the eastern parts of the transcontinental country (and transatlantic empire) it had
joined only decades before and also from the west as Asian immigrants of many nationalities
tried their luck in North America. Both kinds of newcomer used BCCS vessels to pursue
opportunities, and both groups at times even found those opportunities aboard the boats, too.
Working for the BC Coast Steamship Service was a job. For many, it was an unglamorous and
laborious one. For some, it was even a career. Service job though it was, working for BCCS was
also stable employment that came with comradery and contributing to facilitating the province’s
development. There were worse jobs.
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